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Article
Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia:
The Terrifying Second Amendment
David C. Williamst
Ever since its modern rediscovery as a source of ideas for constitutional
analysis, civic republicanism has not rested entirely easily in the bosoms of its
principal supporters, the academic left. This discomfort may be unavoidable,
because republicanism is an old belief system and carries signs of its age, while
the academic left aspires to be progressive. In particular, republicans have
persistently celebrated the right of citizens to keep and bear arms.'
This endorsement and the discomfort it causes to neorepublicans is the
central theme of Sanford Levinson's recent, insightful essay, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment.2 Focusing on their distrust of constituted authority,
Levinson argues that the republican Framers of the Second Amendment insisted
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For their many helpful comments, I would like
to thank Gregory Alexander, Akhil Amar, Hendrik Hartog, James Henderson, Don Kates, Isaac Kramnick,
Sanford Levinson, David Lyons, Frank Michelman, Steven Shiffrin, and Susan Williams.
1. Historically, republicanism was also at times associated with racism and slavery, see KENNETH S.
GREENBERG, MASTERS AND STATESMEN 4 (1985), as well religious intolerance, patriarchy, and oppressive
corporatism and elitism, see JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790's, at 8-19 (1984); Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J 1663,
1668-69 (1988). Old-style republicanism also endorsed a "natural" division of the citizenry into "the One,
the Few, and the Many," see Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court. 1985 Term--Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 44-46 (1986), and an objective public good to which dissenters were
required to conform, see id. at 22.
2. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). The Second
Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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on the right of all private citizens to keep arms, so as to be able to revolt. 3
Under a republican interpretation, then, the Second Amendment provides for
a personal right to own firearms.4 This reading, Levinson suggests, would be
"embarrassing" to the academic left, which would prefer to prohibit private
ownership of guns.5 In a response, Wendy Brown observes that the republican
right of revolution presupposed a virtuous citizenry, and as we do not now have
such a populace, we should not have such a right-even if we believe in
republicanism.6 Moreover, in Brown's view, we need not today slavishly accept
all aspects of early republican doctrine; instead, we should purge the tradition
of its offensive elements-particularly of the sexism and violence suggested
by the Second Amendment.7
This dialogue between Levinson and Brown has had several important
consequences. It has drawn attention to the Second Amendment as a subject
for scholarly analysis,8 and it has attracted the notice of no less a popular pundit
than George Will at a time when the federal government is seriously discussing
nationwide gun control.9 In addition, this dialogue explicitly addresses the
concern that reviving republicanism may bring with it an acceptance, even an
encouragement, of violence.' 0 Levinson and Brown confront these issues with
boldness, clarity, and acuity. I suggest, however, that careful examination of
the intellectual context of the right to arms leads to conclusions different from
both Levinson's and Brown's.
This Article addresses the meaning that the Second Amendment would bear
in a modern republican interpretation. My purpose is primarily heuristic rather
than prescriptive: I offer an analysis of the role of the right to bear arms in
republican theory, not a judgment -concerning the general attractiveness of
republican theory as a whole. Such a concentration on the right to arms in the
republican tradition is important for several reasons. First, the Second Amend-
ment, perhaps more than any other provision of the Constitution, is grounded
3. Levinson and others commonly describe the Amendment as resting on a "right of revolution." I
generally use the phrase "right of resistance" instead, because the right of revolution is so intimately
associated with a Lockean framework in which citizens revolt to protect their individual rights under the
social contract.
4. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 646-50.
5. See id. at 642.
6. See Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford
Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 663, 665 (1989).
7. See id. at 663-64, 665-66.
8. Levinson observes that the amount of academic writing on the Amendment, especially in major
journals, is vastly less than that on other provisions of the Bill of Rights. See Levinson, supra note 2, at
639-42. Before Levinson, the only analysis in a major law journal was Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition
and the Original Meaning of the SecondAmendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983), a particularly influential
piece.
9. Will recently endorsed Levinson's argument, concluding that gun control advocates-like him-
self-must first repeal the Amendment. See George F. Will, The Gun Amendment Befogs a Gunfire Crisis,
ITHACA J., Mar. 22, 1991, at 8A.
10. Many commentators have noted this possibility as a concern without discussing it at any length.
See, e.g., Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37, 42-45
(1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1539-40, 1564 (1988).
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in the republican tradition." We must therefore look principally to republican-
ism for illumination of the historical meaning of this particular Amend-
ment-even if one gives a liberal reading to the rest of the document. Many
commentators have instead offered historical exegeses of the Amendment that,
in my view, miss the significance of its surrounding tradition and mistakenly
find an individual right to arms for self-defense. Second, as the dialogue
between Brown and Levinson illustrates, some neorepublicans find the Amend-
ment embarrassing and feel the need to prune it from the republican thicket.
In contrast, I argue that the Amendment is central to the republican tradition
and perfectly consistent with its principal commitments. Finally, in a broader
sense, an analysis of the Second Amendment in the republican tradition allows
a clearer perspective on the overall advisability of a modern republican revival:
to the extent one finds the modern implications of the provision troubling,
utopian, or just not very useful, one might question the wisdom of the revival
as well.
The republican tradition that lies behind the Second Amendment is not just
embarrassing-it is terrifying. It acknowledges that humans are never wholly
in control of their own destinies. At the heart of republicanism lies a paradox
that mocks human efforts at self-government: republics can never successfully
survive unless their citizens act in a virtuous manner, eschewing private inter-
ests for the sake of the public good, but citizens will not act virtuously except
in a republic that fosters such virtuous conduct. Hence, a republic is in effect
a logical contradiction, a paradox in its very nature. Creating or maintaining
a republic against the constant risk of corruption by particularistic interests is
therefore the most difficult of tasks. Republican theory, however, offers some
structures to aid in this task, prominent among them the universal militia.
The republican framers of the Second Amendment were painfully aware
that ultimate political power would lie with those who controlled the means of
force. As a result, they sought to arm not a narrow slice of society that might
seize the government for its own end, but rather all the citizens in a state, in
the form of a universal militia, which would always act in the common good.
In republican thinking, this militia had an ambiguous status. On the one hand,
it was a creature of the state apparatus, inasmuch as the state" gathered it,
ensured it was universal, trained it in the use of arms, and mobilized it against
foreign invasion or domestic insurrection. On the other hand, it was composed
of all of the citizens, deriving its legitimacy from them and being virtually
synonymous with them.
11. I attribute significance to republicanism in explicating only this provision, not the Constitution as
a whole or late 18th-century American thinking in general.
12. For reasons explained in the next footnote, I use the term "state" throughout this Article to refer
narrowly to the state apparats-the government and its ministers.
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The militia, in other words, constituted a forum in which state and society
met and melded, 3 and this combination offered some advantages for curbing
corruption. If the evil of partiality touched a segment of the population, then
the militia-constituted as an instrument of the state-could restrain any
movement toward demagogic rebellion. But if the state became corrupt, then
the militia-now constituted as "the people"--could resist despotism. Indeed,
the line between state and people ideally disappeared in the militia, in that the
militia members were both rulers and ruled.
From this republican perspective, the error of those who today seek to
guarantee a private right to arms is that they would thereby consign the means
of force to those who happen to possess firearms-a partial slice of soci-
ety-rather than to the whole people assembled in militia. Even in the eight-
eenth century, literal universality was never more than a rhetorical aspiration
or a regulative ideal, but it was nevertheless the prevailing ideal, and any
departure from it meant failure. At a minimum, therefore, any modern version
of this militia must be so inclusive that its composition offers some meaningful
promise that it will not become the tool of a slice of society, as it could in the
case of those who decide for private reasons to buy a gun or to become mem-
bers of the national guard. 4 The militia must be the people acting together,
not isolated persons acting individually.
As we today have no such universal militia and no assurance that contem-
porary arms-bearers will be virtuous, the Second Amendment itself is-for
now-outdated. But republican theory does not, in the absence of a virtuous
citizenry, give up. Through the militia ideal, republicanism offers practical
guidance on how positively to engender civic virtue, in the form of disinterested
self-sacrifice, amongst a nonvirtuous, self-interested populace. Although this
militia ideal may seem hopelessly utopian in its conception of the redemptive
possibility of politics, it is central to the historical tradition as an icon of the
main theme of republicanism-empowering citizens engaged in deliberative
politics in pursuit of a common good.15 It therefore seems worthwhile to
consider the present implications of the militia ideal for courts interpreting the
Second Amendment, and, more importantly, for citizens seeking to realize the
promise of republican government.
For courts, the great change from the 1780's is that without a universal
militia it is impossible to hazard a republican reading of the Second Amend-
13. The melding of rulers and ruled is a characteristic republican aspiration: ideally, there should be
only self-governing citizens. Indeed, there is some question whether or not before The Federalist Americans
even had a theory of the "state" in its modern European sense. See Isaac Kramnick, Editor's Introduction
to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 67 (Isaac Krammick ed., 1987). But republicans did recognize that the state
apparatus was separate from the people and might threaten liberty. The militia offered a place where the
apparatus and society merged.
14. Neither the guard nor private gunowners reflect universality; they are distinct interest groups in
the American game of pluralistic politics.
15. Cf. Michelman, supra note 1, at 74-77 (offering Supreme Court decisionmaking as icon of
republican dialogue).
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ment. The militia was a precondition for the right to arms. Without a militia
the right is meaningless. The republican tradition thus suggests that the provi-
sion as written has become outdated. From a judicial perspective, this part of
republicanism is not very useful, because the world really has changed, and
republicanism cannot mean what it once did.
On the other hand, the Amendment can serve as a regulative ideal, empha-
sizing the importance of committing force to virtue. Despite the effective
nullification of the provision by the disappearance of the militia, judges might
seek other means to secure those ends. In particular, courts can give the
Amendment new life by reinterpreting other constitutional provisions to serve
the functions of the old militia.
The militia ideal has even greater significance for neorepublicans seeking
to reconstruct society in nonjudicial fora. It suggests, in particular, that they
should emphasize the populist strain of republican theory. Since the people can
no longer directly participate through the militia, they need militia-surrogates,
bodies that serve functions formerly served by the militia. One course would
be to reactivate the universal militia itself, which would act on its own views
of the commonweal to resist tyrants and demagogues. The problem with this
course is the extreme danger in giving arms to citizens who are not now and
may never become virtuous. That fear is rational and one that contemporary
republicans should share: republican measures may be inappropriate for an
unrepublican populace.
The better course is to pursue other measures that would grant the people
opportunities to develop virtue, such as universal service, and to control their
own lives-such as workplace democracy. At some later point, it may be
appropriate to reconstitute a universal militia, and the Second Amendment
would reacquire its original meaning. In the interim, the control of arms will
lie with the government, not the people-a profoundly unrepublican condi-
tion-but even within a republican framework some risks are not worth taking.
The suggestion of a revived militia, however, starkly poses the central difficulty
faced by modern neorepublicans: How does a population characterized by
selfish pursuit of discordant interests become a society in which realization of
the "common good" is anything but utopian rhetoric? Neorepublicans have
offered some possible answers, but they go only part of the way-and under
present conditions can not go further-toward reconstructing a republican
militia-surrogate.
This Article will advance two themes. First, unlike Levinson, I do not think
that republicanism supplies a useful way to interpret the Second Amendment
unless there are substantial changes in society. Second, unlike Brown, I do think
that the Amendment's history offers an important regulative ideal in construct-
ing a modern version of republicanism. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part
I considers the extant scholarship and case law dealing with the Second Amend-
ment, focusing on the colloquy between Levinson and Brown. Part II describes
1991]
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the role of the right to arms in republican thought. It first sketches the constant
sense of danger that beset republicans: a republic was a fragile enterprise,
always vulnerable to corruption. It then analyzes the corruption-battling func-
tions served by the militia and the right to bear arms. Service in the militia
trained one to a life of virtue, both self-sacrificing and independent; these
virtuous arms-bearing citizens could block the designs of corrupt factions,
whether those of demagogues among the people or despots among government
ministers, and, if a corrupt faction should seize power, the citizens could resist,
to restore the moral and political health of the republic.
Part III considers the implications of this tradition for a modern interpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment. In particular, I argue that because of the
disappearance of the militia, the Amendment cannot have any literal meaning;
at best, we can use it as a regulative ideal in interpreting other provisions.
Finally, Part IV argues that the militia ideal is consistent with the rest of
republicanism and discusses modern reforms based on that ideal, suggesting
that universal service and measures to increase direct popular control of govern-
ment can move toward serving the function of the old militia.
I. THE DEBATE
A. Before Levinson and Brown
Before the recent dialogue between Levinson and Brown, serious discussion
of the Second Amendment was notably limited. 16 The Supreme Court had
offered little guidance; it has decided only four significant cases under the
provision, none of them recent or definitive. 17 In 1875, the Court held that the
Amendment limited the actions only of government, not of private individu-
als.'8 Later in the century, the Court twice held that the Amendment limited
the actions only of the federal government and not of the states, on the grounds
16. Some commentators have suggested explanations for this silence: a dissembling or timorous
Supreme Court has refused to take cases that would force them to recognize the right. See, e.g., Nelson
Lund, The Second Amendment. Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103,
103-04 (1987). Academics have abetted the judges by pretending that the Amendment does not exist, or
else by willfully ignoring history and reducing the Amendment to a protection for the national guard.
Similarly, Levinson explains that because the Amendment is embarrassing to the established academy,
constitutional scholars dwell long on the First Amendment but then close their eyes and leap to the Fourth.
See Levinson, supra note 2, at 639-42.
17. The Court did mention the Second Amendment in a fifth case, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857), in which Chief Justice Taney warned that if blacks were citizens, they would have
the right to bear arms. See 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-17. Indeed, the right to bear arms was important to
blacks in the years after the Civil War, not only symbolically, as a badge of citizenship, but practically,
as a way to resist white terrorism. See STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 107-53 (1984);
Robert Cottrol & Ray Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towards an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration,
80 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 1991).
18. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,553 (1875). The defendants, who had disarmed ex-slaves,
were indicted under federal laws against conspiracy to deprive a citizen of constitutional rights. The Court
quashed the indictment on the grounds that citizens had no constitutional right against private disarming.
[Vol. 101: 551
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that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.' 9 The Court decided these
cases, however, well before it began to incorporate the rest of the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth Amendment, so the continuing validity of these decisions
is uncertain.' In any event, these cases discussed only the actors against
whom the right applied, not the scope of the right itself.
The Court seriously considered the scope of the right to bear arms in only
one case-United States v. Miller, decided in 1939.21 In Miller, the Court
addressed a Second Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act of
1934, 2 which prohibited, inter alia, possession of a sawed-off shotgun except
in limited circumstances. The Court explained that the purpose of the Amend-
ment was to "assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of
[militia] forces," so that the government would not rely on standing armies.Y3
But because the parties had not adduced "any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a [sawed-off shotgun] has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia," the Court could
not "say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such
an instrument."'  At a minimum, then, Miller limits the scope of the Amend-
ment to arms suitable for use by militia.
Lower courts have suggested that Miller limits the right even further. If the
Amendment's purpose is only to assure the "continuation" and render possible
the "effectiveness" of the militia, then it may protect state governments against
federal tampering with their militia, but it does not guarantee individuals any
19. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 536 (1894) (dismissing writ of error from state conviction for
carrying dangerous weapons on person), Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264 (1886) (dismissing writ of
error from state conviction under law against organization, training, and marching of private armies).
20. Many commentators have argued that courts should assume that the Supreme Court would
incorporate the Amendment today, as it has incorporated other provisions. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 8,
at 252-57; Lund, supra note 16, at 110. A number of courts have ignored such an invitation on the grounds
that even if the Court would so rule, it has not yet done so; Presser and Miller, however old, are still the
Court's last words on the subject. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th
Cir. 1982).
21. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
22. Ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-45 (1988)).
23. 307 U.S. at 178. The Court did not explicitly say so, but it was presumably relying on the opening
clause of the Amendment---"[a] well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state"-for
this assertion. Actually, the Court's full analysis of this point is confusing. The Court first pointed out that
Article I gives Congress the power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invaders. The Court continued: "With obvious purpose to assure the continuation
and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment
were made." Id. The Court here seems to be saying that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to arms,
so that the militia will be ready for Congress' call. The provision thus protects a federal interest in the
readiness of the militia. Such a reading is hard to square with the historical record. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 171-86. The goal of the Amendment cannot be to protect Congress' interest in calling forth
the militia, because Congress had the power to require militia readiness without the Amendment. Instead,
the Amendment limits the power of Congress by providing that it may not disarm the people, even if it
believed that such disarming would for some reason serve the preparedness of the militia.
24. 307 U.S. at 178.
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rights at all.' Some of Miller's language, however, is in tension with such
a reading. In the eighteenth century, the Court explained, the militia "comprised
all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense," and
"when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms
supplied by themselves."26 In other words, the Court strongly suggested that
the Amendment guarantees a private right to own guns, at least by all males
of arms-bearing age, so as to be ready for militia service. But the Court did not
articulate that conclusion in so many words. It was enough to conclude that a
sawed-off shotgun was not appropriate for militia use.'
Faced with this dearth of judicial instruction, commentators fall into only
two groups-often called the individual rights and states' rights positions. The
latter position relies on the language of the clause explaining the Amendment's
purpose: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."
According to this view, the goal of the provision is thus merely to guarantee
the right of the states to maintain their militias, not to guarantee any right to
individuals, and Congress has adequately protected the right of the states with
the National Guard system.'
In contrast, the individual rights' view emphasizes that the Amendment
grants a right to "the people" not to the "states." Moreover, the unorganized
militia in the 1790's included every male of arms-bearing age29 -and still
does.30 The Framers emphasized the importance of the unorganized militia in
the constant struggle to forestall tyranny; one could not rely on the organized
or "select" militia, as that body itself could become corrupt.31 As a last step,
25. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); Stevens v. United States, 440 F2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988); Roy Weatherup, Standing
Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
961, 999 (1975).
26. 307 U.S. at 179.
27. Since Miller, the Court has offered only one perfunctory interpretation of the case. In Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), the Court held that a federal prohibition on the possession of firearms
by a felon did not violate the Constitution because "the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep
and bear a firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia."' Id. at 65-66 n.8 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
28. See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95, 227 n.76 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 25,
at 299 n.6; Weatherup, supra note 25, at 995-96; Peter B. Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment:
A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 46, 61-62 (1966); John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Develop-
ment of the American Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 148, 158-59 (1971).
29. First Militia Act, Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 311-12 (1988)). The
Amendment does specify a "well regulated" militia, which does not sound much like an "unorganized"
militia. But individual rights advocates point out that in the 18th century, "well regulated" was more likely
to mean "trained" or "disciplined" than "government-controlled." See David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens,
Citizen Armies, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 626 n.328 (1986); Lund, supra note 16, at 107 n.8. As
I will argue, one meaning that "well regulated" does not have is "less than universal." See infra note 207.
30. 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1988).
3 1. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 84-87: David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second
Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 31, 37-40 (1976); Hardy, supra note 29, at 623-24; Kates,
supra note 8, at 214-18; Joyce L. Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common
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advocates of the individual rights view typically assert that the Amendment
enshrined a right to own guns not only for revolution but also for defense of
the home and perhaps for hunting and target practice as well.32
B. Levinson and Brown
Professor Levinson injects important new insights into this debate. First,
he brings the recent research to bear on republican ideology. Second, he
carefully distinguishes between the two rights that other commentators have
merged: the Second Amendment might protect an individual right to self-
defense or a "collective" right to revolution, or neither, or both. Republican
ideology, Levinson suggests, supports the right to revolution, but apparently
does not concern itself with the right to self-defense. 33 Moreover, Levinson
himself finds the right to revolution more "interesting"' 4 and apparently
believes that social change may have rendered the right to self-defense, but not
the right to revolution, outdated.35
Levinson's implicit claim that republicanism has little to say about the right
to self-defense and much to say about a right of resistance is, in my view,
correct.36 If the Second Amendment does provide a right to own guns for self-
defense, republicanism cannot supply the intellectual foundation for it. But if
Levinson is correct to tie a right of resistance to republicanism, he is not clear
about who possesses that right-the states, individuals, or some other body. On
the one hand, he considers the republican right as entailing protection for
private, individual ownership of guns. Defining the republican militia as "all
of the people, or at least all of those treated as full citizens of the communi-
ty,"37 he attributes to that great republican James Harrington the view that
liberty depends on independent citizens, and that to be independent of govern-
ment, citizens must own arms. The Second Amendment thus serves to check
government: "[T]he ultimate 'checking value' in a republican polity is the
ability of an armed populace, presumptively motivated by a shared commitment
to the common good, to resist governmental tyranny.' 3 The Second Amend-
ment thus guarantees to each citizen the ability to intimidate potentially tyranni-
cal government with private arms.
Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 314 (1983).
32. See infra notes 198, 200.
33. Levinson's discussion of neorepublicanism occurs only in the context of his analysis of the right
to revolution. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 646-50.
34. Id. at 646-47.
35. See id. at 656. Indeed, the most that Levinson has to say for the right to self-defense is that "it
seems tendentious to reject out of hand the argument that one purpose of the Amendment was to recognize"
it. Id. at 645-46.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 171-86.
37. Levinson, supra note 2, at 646-47.
38. Id. at 648.
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On the other hand, Levinson calls the right to bear arms "collective," and
he distinguishes it from an "individualist" right of self-defense. In what sense
is this right collective? Levinson does not specify. It is plainly not collective
in the sense that it must be exercised by the organized state militia: Levinson
emphasizes that the republican militia includes every citizen, even those who
are not members of the organized militia. At one point, he describes the
citizenry as a "structure" that stands ready to defend liberty against those "other
two structures," the state and federal governments. But he never explains how
the citizens are yoked together into a "structure" rather than existing as loose
atoms. The right described by Levinson seems to be collective in only two
limited senses. First, it is a right held by individuals, though for the good of
the whole: resistance to tyrants is service to the commonweal. Second, as a
practical matter, a single individual cannot resist the government; he needs help
from his friends in a collective surge of indignation. The citizenry is thus a
structure only in the sense that all those atoms serve a structural role in the
republican form of government: considered en masse, but not melded into any
form of organization, the citizens may sufficiently frighten the government so
that it will not become tyrannical.3 9
Wendy Brown launches a three-part attack on Levinson's right of revolu-
tion: it is not republican; it is no longer relevant in our changed world; and
even in its original form, it is a part of republicanism better discarded. First,
she maintains that the "republican argument for arming the citizenry is most
powerfully elaborated not by the English thinkers Levinson cites, but in that
passionate republican work, Machiavelli's Discourses on the First Decade of
Titus Livius." Focusing on Machiavelli's statist tendencies, she then claims
that the "republican citizenry is not armed against the state but as the state-an
armed citizenry is the state's heart, not its opposition or counterweight."4 The
right of revolution, on the other hand, is a product of Lockean liberalism, "in
which a diffident and depoliticized populace squares off against the state, in
which there is no political heart at all but only hands and feet all armed against
one another."'42
This privileging of Machiavelli over all later republicans, in reading an
eighteenth-century amendment, seems unnecessary.43 As a significant early
39. Second Amendment rights are thus not like the Fourteenth Amendment right of intimacy, see, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that statute preventing contraceptive use violated
right of marital privacy); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that statute
compelling Jaycees to accept women as regular members does not violate male members' freedom of
intimate or expressive association). They need collective action to work but are not inherently associational.
40. Brown, supra note 6, at 661.
41. Id. at 662-63.
42. Id. at 663.
43. Moreover, Machiavelli is susceptible to a different reading from Brown's. Machiavelli believed
that a militia offered the best defense against foreign invaders; in that sense the militia was armed as the
state. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livitts, in I THE CHIEF WORKS
AND OTHERS 175, 411 (Allen Gilbert trans., 1965). But another advantage of an armed populace was that
it could resist domestic tyrants. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Art of War, in 2 id. at 561, 578. In so
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republican, Machiavelli may be relevant to the Amendment, but it is difficult
to discern why he is more relevant than Harrington or Trenchard and Gordon.
As Brown acknowledges, those later writers endorsed a right of resistance,"
which belonged not to a liberal "diffident and depoliticized populace" but to
an intensely active citizenry, for whom self-arming was an act of concern for
the health of the state.45
Brown's second criticism of Levinson is more persuasive: republicanism
needs a virtuous citizenry, but Brown "cannot imagine a less appropriate
appellation for the contemporary American citizenry, which bears a shared
commitment to almost nothing, least of all a common good. '46 If the citizenry
is not virtuous, we have no assurance that it will use its arms in virtuous ways.
So Brown predicts pernicious results if we arm our present citizenry: gun
owners are likely to use them to rape women and to murder young urban black
men.47 Whatever the need for a right of resistance by arms in the United
States, there is a high probability that guns will continue to be used in the
future as they have been used in the past. There is no reason to believe that
current American gun owners are either virtuous or representative.41
The republican concept of the universal militia, however, also poses a
challenge to Brown's analysis. Recognizing that republicanism relies on a
virtuous populace that we lack does not end the inquiry, but only frames it:
what do we do now? For Brown, the answer seems self-evident. We should
abandon republicanism or at least this aspect of it: "Like Levinson, I would
prefer a republican order to a liberal-capitalist one. But we do not have a
resisting, the citizens were still armed "as the state" in the sense that the despot had stopped representing
the state and the people had stepped into the gap. But this description does not lead to Brown's conclusion.
In one semantic usage, the Machiavellian citizenry cannot resist the state because it is the state; but it can
resist the government. Indeed, Quentin Skinner has argued that Machiavelli's call for devotion to the
common good was strictly instrumental to ensuring each citizen negative liberty from government; only
if we each act as responsible citizens can any person have the freedom to order his own affairs as he wishes.
See Quentin Skinner, The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives, in PHILOSO-
PHY IN HIsTORY 193, 204-19 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1984).
44. These English writers may be more antistatist than Machiavelli because republicanism, when it
crossed the English Channel, confronted a more established and monarchical state than the unstable city-
states of Italy. English republicans therefore had to develop a doctrine of resistance to justify their departure
from royalism. See J.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 345-48, 371-75 (1975).
45. Brown seems to equate the republican right of revolution with a liberal right of autonomy. She
describes the right of revolution as a "freedom that depicts man, collectively or individually, securing his
autonomy, his woman, and his territory with a gun-a formulation signified in our epoch by Eugene
Hasenfus flying over the forests of Central America... or Ollie North's good intentions." Brown, supra
note 6, at 664. But far from the goals of republicanism, the Hasenfus and North events signify its deepest
fears: members of a standing army or shadow standing army under executive direction running a secret war
on private funds in distant lands against the express will of Congress. In fact, 18th-century republicans would
point precisely to these events as the inevitable outcome of the failure of the private population to arm itself,
leaving their defense to cowboy adventurers. Brown may mean that "redneck" gun owners (who seem to
be her real target, see id. at 666-67) may applaud Hasenfus and North, but there is a great difference
between Thomas Jefferson and North.
46. Id. at 663.
47. Id. at 665.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 214-25.
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republican political order; we are not a republican citizenry . . . And we
cannot generate a republican order merely by interpreting our Constitution
through a republican hermeneutic scheme. '49 But this imprecation is a counsel
of despair. "Merely" reading the Constitution through republican lenses may
not by itself create a republican order, but it may be one piece of the process.
And republicanism offers us other ways by which citizens may achieve virtue:
political participation, owning property independent of landlords or employers,
and membership in a citizen militia.
Ultimately, Brown may discount the possibility of creating a virtuous
populace through a militia because she has a deeper critique of the right to
arms: "[E]ven within republicanism, we do not have to swallow it whole. The
republican intellectual tradition includes a militarism, elitism, and machismo
that is past due for thoughtful critique and reworking."50 Republicanism
appeals to many because it emphasizes community over separation and public
dialogue over strict autonomy. In this sense, it shares many features with
modern cultural feminism.5t But contained within republicanism is this harsh
"macho" kernel: the right to arms is a "bit 'gendered'... subduing with force,
what it cannot discursively persuade, tame, or cohabit the universe with, and
possessing with force what it cannot seduce."52 Facing this apparent conflict
within republicanism, Brown, like others, recommends that we wean republican-
ism from its objectionable elements-in this case by abandoning the right to
arms.
53
This recommendation, however, assumes that the militia is on the periphery
of republicanism and in conflict with its core. Rightly understood, however, the
right to arms is thoroughly consistent with republicanism's other commitments.
It does contemplate that citizens may sometimes have to take up arms to defend
liberty. But it vests that right in a body notable for its interactive and collective
nature, to prevent the politics of interest and to encourage the politics of the
49. Brown, supra note 6, at 665.
50. Id. at 666.
51. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REv. 543, 550-54, 591 (1986); Michelman, supra note 1, at 17 n.68, 28-33 (1985).
52. Brown, supra note 6, at 663-64.
53. Id. at 665; see also Kerber, supra note 1, at 1665 (noting that an emphasis on arms-bearing gave
republican tradition a militaristic core); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1564 (classifying one strain of republican-
ism thought as "militaristic and heroic, and associating political behavior with warfare"). Although these
writers do not directly cite it, the inspiration for this view may be Hannah Fenichel Pitkin's Fortune Is a
Woman, which argues that much of Machiavelli's thought is misogynistic. HANNAH F. PITKIN, FORTUNE
IS A WOMAN (1984). Actually, Pitkin argued that in writing about the citizenry and the militia, Machiavelli
is at his least misogynistic. Machiavelli often casts the citizen and militia member as an appealing blend
of those feminist virtues of interdependence, cooperation, and healthy disagreement within dialogue. See
id. at 63-68, 90-97, 232. When Machiavelli comes to doubt the possibility of such a public-spirited dialogue,
he becomes most emphatically misogynistic, conjuring up the specter of a protofascist Father/Founder to
bring order, see id. at 75, 97-105, against the threat of Fortune, Woman, and Mother. See id. at 230-32,
68-73; see also Isaac Kramnick, Rousseau and Vomen: An Alternative Reading, in COMPARATIVE THEORY
AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 64, 66-75 (Peter J. Katzenstein et al. eds., 1990) (although Rousseau is
sometimes sexist, his true community rests on maternalized state characterized by politicized love for others).
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common good. If one believes in the bulk of republicanism, then, one should
believe in the militia as well. The next part will develop this claim by putting
the right to arms in context within the republican tradition.
II. THE RIGHT TO ARMS IN THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION
This part offers an historical reconstruction of the role of the right to arms
in republican thinking. Fundamentally, republicans saw the militia as a response
to the danger of corruption. In the first section below, I outline the nature of
the republicans' fears. In the next section, I analyze the way in which the
militia responded to those fears.
A republican government was thought to be one that pursued the common
good rather than the private interest of a slice of society. But republics were
inherently unstable, because a republican form of government depended on
virtuous citizens, while citizens could be virtuous only in a republican govern-
ment. As a result, corruption could arise either from a distortion of the form
of government or from a public falling into self-interest.
The militia was thought to be able to restrain corruption because it was
virtuous and possessed ultimate control over the means of force. It was virtuous
both because it comprised the universal people and because it offered training
in the habits of virtue. And as the people, it was both government and society.
The state raised it and ensured that it was universal. Under state direction, the
militia would repress demagogic revolts made in the interests of a few. But
despite this tie to the government, the militia was a people's body. Its member-
ship included all of the citizenry, and if the government should ever become
corrupt, it could resist by arms. To offer these advantages, the militia had to
be universal, not a subset of private persons or the state apparatus.
A. The Danger of Corruption
1. Republican Paradoxes
Eighteenth-century republicans shared certain views about the nature of
human beings. Humans have public, political selves; they are capable of
forming cooperative ventures that will benefit all. The polity itself is a universal
association, "in which all types of men combine to pursue all human goods,"
that can achieve a universal good that is more than the realization of the private
interests of a few.54 At the same time, however, each individual has a private,
54. G.A. Pocock, Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE
AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80, 86 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1973). The classic
exposition of these ideas, and the inspiration for later republicans, is Aristotle's Politics. See, e.g., POCOCK,
supra note 44, at 66-68; Michelman, supra note I, at 38.
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particular self and self-interest,55 and his public and private selves can come
into conflict. A good state is one in which citizens pursue the common good;
a bad state is one that has been seized by a slice of society for its own narrow
ends. 56
Republicans hoped to induce citizens to pursue the common good, but in
doing so they faced a problem: the virtue of the state and of its citizens are
always interdependent.5 ' To be virtuous, a citizen must live in a state that
enshrines the common good; otherwise he can be no more than one bit of self-
serving flotsam swirling around other bits, for there is no common good to
serve.58 The state, however, will never enshrine the common good unless its
citizens are virtuous-but the only way for them to be virtuous is for the state
to enshrine the common good. The causation is two-way: citizens make the
state, and the state makes citizens. Neither can be virtuous unless the other
is.
5 9
This closed circle created a republican paradox:6" citizens are simulta-
neously creatures and creators of the state. That paradox gave rise to another
one: the problem of creating a republic-the problem of origins. Virtuous
citizens would create virtuous states, and virtuous states would create virtuous
citizens, but how does one secure either of these? The paradox lies in the self-
levitating quality of republics: they somehow come into being, but humans
might not be able to find a patch of terra firma from which to launch one. A
republic thus depends on conditions being right; a republican form of govern-
55. See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note 44, at 68.
56. See, e.g., id. at 7, 75; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,
at 53-57 (1969). It should be noted that the common good was not in opposition to individual freedoms.
Republicans typically believed that part of the common good was individual liberty for all, see id. at 18-28,
and in any event, liberty was instrumentally necessary to the commonweal. See infra text accompanying
notes 68, 71. Indeed, Machiavelli may even have valued a politics of the common good chiefly as an
instrument to negative liberty against government. But the common good did not include the pursuit of self-
interest as such; liberty must never be abused. See Skinner, supra note 43, at 204-19.
57. I think that this idea may be implicit in Pocock's discussion of the "Machiavellian Moment," see
supra notes 44, 56; infra note 58, but I have formulated it in a somewhat more stark and direct way to
emphasize the republican sense of danger.
58. See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note 44, at 74-75.
59. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 118-119; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 204-05. By the same token, state
and society can be mutually reinforcing if both are virtuous. For American republicans, "The relationship
between government and society, in America as in England, was reciprocal, and America's healthy
republican society presented the proper framework for a free government that would in turn sustain the
integrity of a republican society and economy." DREw R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC 62 (1980).
60. I speak of this tension as a paradox because at its strongest it involves logically inconsistent
propositions: citizens are creatures and creators of the thing that creates them; a republic can come into being
only through a citizenry that can come into being only through a republic; rights are both the precondition
and product of deliberative politics. The paradox might only be apparent; indeed, for republics to exist, it
would have to be. In a less stark form, the tension might more closely resemble a dialectic: a somewhat
virtuous state may act on a citizenry, which would then react on the state to make it more virtuous, and
so forth. But I express the tension in its strong, paradoxical form to stress the anxiety it caused: citizens
must be independent of the state but also a product of it.
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ment would not be viable at all times and for all peoples.61 Those hoping for
a republic might be unable to induce those conditions, and they might have to
wait for history or providence to deliver a virtuous people, so that republican
government becomes possible.62 Some republican thinkers pursued the other
end of the equation: they hoped for good government to make possible a
virtuous people.61
Even if the miracle did occur, and a republican state somehow came into
being, it was always in danger of slipping into corruption-the problem of
maintenance. Because state and society depended on each other, if either began
to lose virtue, each would quickly corrupt the other. Since neither could serve
as an anchor, republicans saw the path to perdition as short, smooth, and
slippery. And the world contained many hostile forces that might induce that
slide; Fortuna, under various names, always lurked as a malevolent force.'
So at the first sign of corruption, there seemed only a short time to save the
republic before it was too late.65
This set of relationships is connected to another paradox: the complicated
republican status of rights and autonomy.66 In republican theory, citizens must,
on the one hand, be independent of the state, so that they may critique it if it
becomes corrupt: hence the republican denunciation of slavish subservience and
praise of those brave enough to defy public ministers and even public opin-
61. See McCOY, supra note 59, at 5. The vulnerability of republicanism to certain conditions is in
contrast to so-called liberal individualism, which takes people as it finds them-presuming them to be self-
interested-and constructs a scheme of government that tempers even their worst excesses. See infra text
accompanying notes 96-98. Martha Nussbaum argues that vulnerability to conditions is one of the central
features that distinguish the Aristotelian tradition from the liberal tradition associated with Plato and Kant.
See MARTHA C. NUSsBAUm , THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 3-7, 329-330 (1986).
62. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 56, at 66, 91-93, 123-24; Sherry, supra note 51, at 557. Some
republicans sought a different way out of this difficulty: a glorious and virtuous leader might inspire or mold
the citizenry to virtue. In Hannah Pitkin's view, this idea explains the fascist elements of Machiavelli's
thought. In desperation at Florentine corruption, he conceived the semimythical figure of the Found-
er-infinitely good, powerful, and self-originating-who could mold them to virtue. See PrIKIN, supra note
53, at 54-56, 75-79. By definition, the Founder is unlike ordinary mortals in that he escapes the republican
paradox: he can be virtuous outside of a republican state and can therefore provide the necessary starting
point for a republic. Therefore, to hope for a Founder is to hope for a miracle.
63. See MCCOY, supra note 59, at 7. John Adams, for example, ultimately concluded that virtue was
the effect, not the cause, of good government. See JOHN P. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN
POLITCS 69-71 (1984). Similarly, the idea that the militia can provide training in virtue, see infra text
accompanying notes 162-70, suggests thatrepublican government can create republican citizens. Those who
chose this strategy seem to have been more activist: one could take steps to secure virtue by changing the
form of governments. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 120-22.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78, 84-87.
65. See, e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUAsION 61 (1978); POCOCK, supra note 44,
at 205, 506-07.
66. For other descriptions of this tangled attitude, see Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988); Michelman, supra note 1, at 42-43. For an example of a modern writer struggling with the
same tension, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources. Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINsM 7, 20-36 (1989).
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ion.67 In order to attain this independence, citizens must have rights that can-
not be affected by politics, so that the citizens will not be threatened by repri-
sals from a corrupt government.68 This end of the paradox reflects one side
of the interdependence between state and society: to have a virtuous state, there
must be virtuous citizens.
At the same time, republicans believed that individuals are unable to be
truly separate or fully independent, because they are products of the state. The
very values that republican citizens hold are not given, but are the product of
politics-hopefully deliberative, healthy politics, but politics nonetheless. 69
Citizens, moreover, must not use their rights to pursue their own self-interest
ahead of the common good. Thus, the citizen cannot stand apart from the
political process and use it as a mere instrument of his desires.70 This convic-
tion reflects the other side of the state/society equation: to have virtuous
citizens, there must be a virtuous state. For republicans, then, rights are not only
the precondition for good politics, but also the product of politics, not to be
invoked as trumps to disrupt the deliberative dialogue.71
Citizens must thus have sufficient autonomy to stand against the state when
it errs, but they also must be aware that their autonomy exists only for the
common good and because of the self-restraining virtue of other citizens.
Republican virtue includes two components: a good citizen must be prepared
to sacrifice himself for the good of the whole, and he must also be independent
enough to know when to resist a corrupt state. There is no inherent contradic-
tion here. Because citizens in a republic must always act for the common good,
when the state is representing that good, the citizen must sacrifice his good to
that of the state. In contrast, when the state is wandering, the citizen must resist.
There is, however, a deep tension in the habits of mind required: the citizen
67. On this side of the Atlantic, the greatest pitch of denunciation occurred just before and during the
War for Independence. See CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL
ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER 1775-1783, at 6-10 (1979); WOOD, supra note 56, at 37-38, 52-53.
68. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 43.
69. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 27; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1548-49.
70. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 61-64.
71. See Michelman, supra note 66, at 1505. This paradox may be most acute in republican ideas about
property rights. On the one hand, along with arms possession, private property was the central guarantee
of citizen independence from the government. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 386-89; Gregory S. Alexander,
Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 294-95 (1991);
MCCOY, supra note 59, at 62-68. On the other hand, republicans recognized that property rights were a
product of collective decisions and depended on collective protection. They also knew that severe inequalities
of property would bring their own form of dependence of some citizens on others. See Michelman, supra
note 1, at 40-41; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 386-91; Alexander, supra, at 287, 293-94. But what if a system
of private, alienable property resulted in severe inequalities of wealth through private exchange? For the
state to intervene would be to acknowledge the social construction of property rights and the ephemerality
of citizen independence. But for the state not to intervene would be to tolerate the very dependence that
property rights were supposed to eliminate in the first place. See MCCOY, supra note 59, at 72; Alexander,
supra at 294-302; WOOD, supra note 56, at 64-05. In the face of this tension, republican responses differed:
some recommended redistribution of property, see POCOCK, supra note 44, at 387; Michelman, supra note
1, at 41 n.214; Alexander, supra at 290; WOOD, supra note 56, at 64, some recommended a bar to
redistribution, see Alexander, supra, at 291, and most conveniently ignored the problem.
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of a republic is expected sometimes to be profoundly selfless, and sometimes
profoundly assertive. He must have the intelligence to know when to be which
and the emotional agility to shift modes when appropriate.
2. The Balance of Estates
Both problems-origin and maintenance-rested on fear of lack of popular
virtue and susceptibility to corruption. As a result, republicans endlessly
analyzed the causes and cures of corruption. By the eighteenth century, two
primary themes had emerged from this discussion-the danger of an imbalance
of estates, which emphasized corruption in government, and the danger of
professionalization, which emphasized corruption in society.
Balance-of-estates theory presented society as naturally divided into three
estates-the One, the Few, and the Many-each with its own political virtues
and vices. Unchecked, any one of the three might misdirect the state to its own
partial good; thus a republican polity should balance the estates against one
another, allowing each to walk a distinct path to the universal good.72 Main-
taining that relationship, however, was never easy.73 In the eighteenth century,
concern about the balance of estates in Britain focused on the Crown. As the
empire grew by trade and arms, so did the power of the Crown, through new
military organizations-especially the standing army74 -and through royal
exploitation of newly developed financial institutions and techniques, notably
taxes, credit, and banks." The core of the fear was executive dominance of
Parliament: with its expanded resources, the Crown could buy the loyalty of
Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) by offering places and pensions in the royal
service.76
During the imperial crisis, American colonials frequently expressed their
grievances with Britain in similar terms: the tyrant George III had subverted
Parliament, invaded historical colonial privilege, and appointed autocratic
governors.?n Upon achieving independence, the new states reacted to this fear
of the executive by drafting new constitutions that curtailed executive power
and expanded the power of the lower legislative house.78 In the process, they
began to alter the meaning of mixed government by insisting that the Few and
72. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 71-80, 99-100, 115-16; BANNING, supra note 65, at 22-28, 33-34,
40-41; WOOD, supra note 56, at 197-202; Michelman, supra note 1, at 4346.
73. The classical form of this problem, sometimes recited in the 18th century, was the Polybian cycle.
A republic might achieve equilibrium between the three estates, but never for long; as it became more
prosperous and powerful, it would become impossible to maintain the balance. It would then begin to
degenerate into less healthy forms of governments in a predictable sequence. See POCOCK, supra note 44,
at 79-80; BANNING, supra note 65, at 42, 47-48.
74. See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 65, at 54.
75. See id. at 65-66.
76. See id. at 42-03, 49-51; WOOD, supra note 56, at 32-34; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 406-08.
77. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 78-80, 82; WOOD, supra note 56, at 32-34, 200-02.
78. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 84-87; EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 245-47
(1988).
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the One should not consist of hereditary estates.79 They felt that the creation
of hereditary orders would give the Few and the One too much power, tempting
them to subvert the balance.80 Moreover, while most republicans believed that
a natural aristocracy existed in America, they viewed this aristocracy as one
of talent rather than of birth," which was assimilable into a broadly democrat-
ic frame of government. While the elements of government that reflected aristo-
cratic influences might be less democratic than others, all would be directly or
indirectly elected by the people.8" In this manner, American republicans devel-
oped a system of democratic republicanism in which the One, the Few, and the
Many ceased to be separate estates, and became instead distinct parts of a
balanced government staffed by the people's representatives. 3
3. Professionalization
In republican eyes, however, the threat of corruption was wider and deeper
than the traditional language of balanced estates could accommodate. Because
of the developing economy and empire, the whole fabric of English society
during the eighteenth century seemed in peril of being rent into partial interests
acting for their own ends. The new commercial society encouraged citizens to
pursue selfish interests.' Perhaps more importantly, it gave them separate ends
because it promoted the specialization of economic function. English republi-
can writers held up as an ideal the ancient republics in which every citizen
fulfilled every function-working his own land and taking up arms to defend
the republic.8 6
79. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 81, 86; WOOD, supra note 56, at 208-09; POCOCK, supra note 44,
at 514-17.
80. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 111-30.
8 1. See id. at 70-73. On this point, Americans followed earlier republicans, especially Harrington
himself. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 394-95.
82. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 205-07; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 515.
83. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 237-55.
84. See McCOY, supra note 59, at 23; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 444-45, 462-66. For example,
Members of Parliament looked to their own income, rather than to the public welfare, by taking monarchical
bribes, see MCCOY, supra note 59, at 57-58; BANNING, supra note 65, at 52, 59; ISAAC KRAMNICK,
REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM 178 (1990); the standing army looked to ensure its own
continued existence by fomenting and standing ready to fight foreign wars, see POCOCK, supra note 44,
at 409-10, 412-14; KRAMNICK, supra, at 178; the monied interest, too, encouraged war, because war gave
rise to public debt, which made money for men of wealth, see BANNING, supra note 65, at 65-67; POCOCK,
supra note 44, at 409-10, 439; KRAMNICK, supra, at 178. Deeply complicit in this vast conspiracy was the
Crown, which now possessed both money and military might, so that if any should be inclined to protest,
their resistance could not be a long one. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 52-59, 65-67.
85. See MCCOY, supra note 59, at 37-38; BANNING, supra note 65, at 67; POCOCK, supra note 44, at
430-31.
86. The Court Party and its intellectual backers defended specialization as progress, since it created
prosperity and culture. See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note 44, at 459-60; MCCOY, supra note 59, at 25-32. The
Country Party-the self-conscious expositors of republican ideas-responded that if prosperity and culture
could come only with specialization, it was better to accept some coarseness and retain political morality.
See MCCOY, supra note 59, at 32-33; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 430-31, 499-505. In the context of 18th-
century England, one might describe the Country Party itself as a special interest: the party of rural,
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Many American colonial writers shared these worries about Britain's social
character. In their view, the English people had made their peace with tyranny
and so had come to prefer luxury to liberty.8 7 More broadly, the degenerative
effects of social development had fractured the English populace.8 Americans,
in contrast, retained a virtue that Britons had lost. They remained poised
between barbarism and effete decay-sturdy but civilized farmers, independent
and unspecialized. 9
This American concern over professionalization as a cause of corruption
reflected a subtle democratic drift away from the classical ideal of mixed
government. Even within the balance-of-estates structure, republicans typically
cast themselves as the champions of the liberty of the Many against the One,
and this posture gave their rhetoric a populist tone.9" But in standing against
specialization, republicans cast themselves not as the representatives of any
particular estate, but as those virtuous souls-the mass of the American peo-
ple-who stood for a commonwealth against the corrupting tide of moderni-
ty.91
4. The Liberal Constitution and Democratic Republican Demands for a
Bill of Rights
Immediately after achieving independence, one course of reform seemed
particularly desirable to many Americans. Since the threat of overreaching arose
primarily from the less democratic elements of government and since the body
of the American people possessed uncommon virtue, the new constitutions
should increase the role of the people in government. Ultimately, this role had
its limits. Few republicans claimed that direct democracy was a practicable
course in any of the new states;92 virtually all conceded that a representative
democracy must balance the branches of government against one another.93
At the same time, however, republican reformers sought to redistribute the
backward-looking landed wealth. See KRAMNICK, supra note 84, at 165, 177; ISAAC KRAMNICK,
BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE: THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE (1968). They did
not perceive themselves as such, however, because they believed that if all remained like themselves, Britons
could share a common good-but in no imaginable order could soldiers, administrators, stockjobbers,
lacemakers, factory owners, and farmers coalesce into a shared interest See BANNING, supra note 65, at
68-69. Later, American republicans would exhibit a similar tendency by identifying the middle class with
the people as a whole. See KRAMNICK, supra note 84, at 277.
87. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 80; WOOD, supra note 56, at 34.
88. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 75-76; WOOD, supra note 56, at 34-37; McCOY, supra note 59,
at 57-58.
89. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 76-77; McCoy, supra note 59, at 62-70; WOOD, supra note 56,
at 52-53, 57-60, 98-101, 113-14; KRATINICK, supra note 84, at 268-69. Still others would allow for
development but were concerned to stop it before it went too far. See McCOY, supra note 59, at 72-75.
90. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 63-64; WOOD, supra note 56, at 20.
91. The transition apparently was easy, since republicans often conflated the good of the whole and
the good of the Many. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 20.
92. See id. at 222-24.
93. See BANNING, supra note 65, at 70, 197.
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balance by limiting the authority of the executive, expanding the power of the
lower house of the legislature, and increasing the dependency of the upper
house on the will of the Many.94
The 1780's, however, brought new worries. To many, the new democratic
legislatures seemed to be fora for pursuit of private interests, especially of the
less affluent, rather than for discussion of the common good. America, it
seemed, had entered modernity with the rest of the world, fragmented and self-
interested. 5 One response to this crisis was the Federalists' embrace of liberal-
ism. With an apparent sense of relief, they leapt off the tightrope of virtue into
the chasm of appetite. Proclaiming that the bulk of the people would always
be self-interested, they asserted that any sensible political system must use the
structure of government not to inspire virtue but to limit the damage done by
self-interest.96 Taking the old rhetoric of mixed government and imbuing it
with new meaning, the Federalists sought to remove power from local legisla-
tures to a central government where different factions and branches of govern-
ment could check one another.97
By the 1780's, it was too late to deny that all power derived from the
people, but the Federalists gave the people a new role. The people mythically
erected the Constitution that delegated power to each of the components of a
distant government, and they participated from afar in the selection of their
representatives. Otherwise, they essentially retired from politics; they had no
direct hand in their own government. Meanwhile, their representatives carried
forward the messy business of mutual limitation.98 No longer would the people
have to be virtuous for government to be just and stable.
By the early 1790's, then, many of the nation's leaders had adopted a
largely liberal ideology, and the decade as a whole was one of complex interac-
tion between new ideas and old, with both amply represented.99 But even after
94. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 162-173; Kramnick, supra note 13, at 18, 21-23.
95. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 396-98, 402-06, 410-11, 414-18.
96. See, e.g., id. at 429, 612-13; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 521-23; KRAMINICK, supra note 84, at 262-
64. Federalists embraced a variety of views, departing from the old republican ideal by degrees. James
Madison, for example, maintained only that the bulk of the people would be self-interested, so that the goal
of government was to elevate the virtuous few to office. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-48 (1985); WOOD, supra note 56, at 505-07; KRAMNICK, supra note
84, at 270-7 1. Alexander Hamilton, by contrast, closely anticipated modern free market liberals by insisting
that the end of government is not virtue but prosperity and that individuals best help the country by helping
themselves. See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 65, at 134-40. All, however, shared a conviction that a republic
pervaded by virtuous self-denial was not possible.
97. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 407, 501-05, 547-62; BANNING, supra note 65, at 87-90; POCOCK,
supra note 44, at 522-23.
98. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 544-47; BANNING, supra note 65, at 97-102; POCOCK, supra note
44, at 517-21.
99. See generally KRAMNICK, supra note 84. Even Gordon Wood, who is most associated with the
recovery of the republican tradition, believes that the decade was a time of transition to more liberal ideas.
See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 56, at 606-15. Others, however, argue that republicanism retained a powerful
hold on American thinking into the 19th century. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 526-52. See generally
BANNING, supra note 65 (arguing that Jeffersonian party platform was product of civic republican heritage);
STEVEN WATTS, THE REPUBLIC REBORN: WAR AND THE MAKING OF LIBERAL AMERICA 1790-1820 (1987)
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the adoption of a more liberal Constitution, some American thinkers retained
old republican convictions."°° They continued to hope that prompt action on
both social and governmental fronts might preserve a truly republican Ameri-
ca.
l0 1
These thinkers, predominantly Anti-Federalist republicans, feared the central
government because they believed that it would be dominated by economic
elites, distant from the people, acting to pursue their own self-interest. They
resisted the adoption of the Constitution in order to keep power in their more
egalitarian and democratic state assemblies, 02 and they urged the creation of
a Bill of Rights that would limit the damage that the central government could
do. t"3 Thus, while over much of its history republicanism may have been
associated with wealthy elites who possessed the leisure to devote themselves
to politics, at this Anti-Federalist moment, republicanism belonged in large part
to men with back-country accents who feared such elites.'t° The Second
Amendment grew out of this reaction-a republican avatar, perhaps, in a
growingly liberal age. Thus, even if liberal ideas had begun to supplant republi-
can ones by 1792,105 it is appropriate to read the Second Amendment in a
republican light."0 '
(arguing that republicanism gave way gradually to liberalism in general culture in early 19th century). Still
others argue that liberal ideas had largely replaced republican ones by the 1790's. See generally JOHN P.
DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984); THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN
REPUBLICANISM (1988). For my purposes, the exact resolution of this debate is not critical because,
regardless of whether the decade as a whole was liberal, the Second Amendment in particular was
republican.
100. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 425-29; KRAI vqlCK, supra note 84, at 266-68.
101. They issued perorations to the people to return to austere republican simplicity, see, e.g., WOOD,
supra note 56, at 426-28; KRAMNICK, supra note 84, at 267-68, and they waited for new republican
governments to mold the people to virtue. See, e.g.. WOOD, supra note 56, at 426.
102. See EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, A PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION 273-79 (1981); WOOD, supra note 56,
at 519-23; Kramnick, supra note 53, at 15, 45-46.
103. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 56, at 536-38; Kramnick, supra note 13, at 60-61. This view of the
Bill of Rights-as a democratic republican response to the text of the Constitution-is the central thesis
of a recent, rich, and significant article by Akhil Amar. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). Professor Amar advances an interpretation of the Second
Amendment that, like mine, emphasizes its populist and localist character. See id. at 1162-73. He also
sensitively discusses the ways in which these themes underlie other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
104. Kramnick, supra note 53, at 23-24, 27, 62-63.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
106. Commentators on both sides of the historical debate seem to agree. Pocock, for example, explains:
"[Tlhe Second Amendment to the Constitution ... affirms the relation between a popular militia and popular
freedom in language directly descended from that of Machiavelli, which remains a potent ritual utterance
in the United States to this day." POCOCK, supra note 44, at 528. On the other side, Kramnick connects
the new comfort with a standing army with a new liberal mood, see KRAMNICK, supra note 84, at 171, 265-
66; Kramnick, supra note 13, at 56-57, but as I will elaborate, the Second Amendment grew out of that
strain of American thinking still uncomfortable with a professional army.
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B. Arms and the Militia in Republican Thought
1. The Problem of a Standing Army
The Second Amendment begins with the claim that a "well regulated
militia" is "necessary to the security of a free state." This language implicitly
refers to an old set of republican fears and hopes: a militia could help to limit
corruption, unlike a standing army, which would be part of the problem. As
Elbridge Gerry stated during congressional discussion of the Amendment:
"What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a
standing army, the bane of liberty." 7 Liberals, by contrast, little feared a
standing army and little valued the militia."8
Republicans believed that the state must arm itself to resist foreign aggres-
sion and to keep civil order. But the distribution of arms caused them great
anxiety, because whoever held the weapons and real property within a republic
also held ultimate control. 109 In arming itself, the state had two options: a
standing professional army or a popular militia. The former posed two great
threats of corruption. First, it could become a tool of executive usurpation.
Second, the army posed a risk of factionalism and professionalization.
Evidence of the former threat was ample. Standing armies arose in England
as a tool of the Stuart monarchs' ambitions for power, and memories of that
time remained vivid in republicans' minds.' t0 The standing forces were at hand
to tempt the King to adopt and enforce unpopular policies; its members would
follow his will rather than the common good because they depended on him
for their livelihood."' The army was, moreover, one of the chief avenues for
subversion of Parliament, as many M.P.'s held places in the army. 12
American colonists were familiar with the consequences of executive
control of the military. Throughout the eighteenth century, colonists experienced
107. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749-50 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
108. See supra note 106.
109. For example, James Burgh, the great transmitter of republican ideas to the colonies, see BANNING,
supra note 65, at 60-62, made the connection between power and arms explicit: "Those, who have the
command of the arms in a country, says Aristotle, are masters of the state, and have it in their power to
make what revolutions they please." 2 JOSEPH BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS: OR, AN ENQUIRY INTO
PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS, AND ABUSES 345 (London, 1775). On power following property, the classic
republican source is James Harrington, who made that claim the center of his theory of government. See
POCOCK, supra note 44, at 385-91.
110. See JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETrERS NO. 94, reprinted in THE ENGLISH
LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE 222-23 (David L. Jacobson ed., 1965); Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse of Govern-
ment with Relation to Militias, in SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 1, 10 (David Daiches ed.,
1979); W.A. SPECK, RELUCTANT REVOLUTIONARIES 145-46, 154-56 (1988); POCOCK, supra note 44, at 411-
12. After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament controlled the finances of the army-a fact that assuaged the
worries of many moderate Whigs.
111. See Fletcher, supra note I 10, at 4, 15; LAWRENCE D. CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMdY AND
THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 23-25 (1982); POCOCK, supra note 44, at
413.
112. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 6: CRESS, supra note I 11, at 20, 23-25; POCOCK, supra note 44,
at 409-410, 412-13.
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friction with the contingents of British regulars stationed near them."t3 Fol-
lowing the Seven Years' War, this friction increased dramatically when Britain
decided that the colonists should pay for their own defense. For the first time,
the imperial government levied a tax on the colonies for revenue purposes,"1 4
and that revenue, ominously, went to the upkeep of the standing army. When
the colonists refused to pay, claiming that taxation without representation was
tyranny,"t5 the imperial government ordered the military occupation of Boston
to enforce the policy. Perhaps most alarmingly, the occupying army was made
up not only of British regulars, but also of Hessian mercenaries.11 6 The colo-
nists were experiencing a republican nightmare: an unrepresentative government
was using a standing army against them to enforce an unjust policy."7
Like English radicals, many American republicans blamed George III for
these abuses.118 Others recognized that Parliament, controlled by conspiratorial
ministers and placemen, was at least as complicitous as the King in the new
policies.1 9 It made little difference to American republicans, however, wheth-
er Parliament or the King controlled the standing army, since in either case it
was not subject to the colonists' own legislatures. 2 After the Revolution, the
framers of the new state constitutions took pains to ensure that the state military
was under legislative, rather than executive, control. For some, this arrangement
ameliorated the worst fears of a standing army.21
A standing army, however, posed a second threat: regardless of who
controlled it, the very existence of a standing army provided the opportunity
for social corruption through professionalization. The army was a symptom and
product of modern specialization of economic function, because soldiers were
trained to a particular trade-fighting-and sought to maintain their particular
113. See generally DOUGLAS E. LEACH, ROOTS OF CONFLICT: BRITISH ARMED FORCES AND COLONIAL
AMERICANS, 1677-1763 (1986). The colonies never raised a standing army; they defended themselves against
Indian attack first by militia and later by expeditionary forces made up of volunteers or impressed paupers,
sometimes commanded by British officers. See CRESS, supra note 111, at 4-8; E. Wayne Carp, The Problem
of National Defense in the Early Wood, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 19-20
(Jack P. Greene ed., 1987). But colonial militia served with British regulars in various conflicts and came
away with sour recollections. See generally LEACH, supra. Throughout the century, moreover, there was
constant tension between colonists and regulars over quartering troops and impressment. See CRESS, supra
note 111, at 10-I1; LEACH, supra, at 10-11, 87-92; PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION
6-7, 9-12, 20, 124-25 (1974).
114. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER 80 (1986).
115. See id. at 81-82.
116. Hence the charge against George III in the Declaration of Independence that he sent "large Armies
of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, destruction, and tyranny..... THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 27 (U.S. 1776).
117. See CRESS, supra note 11, at II, 36-39; Carp, supra note 113, at 21-22; ROYSTER, supra note
67, at 36.
118. See MAIER, supra note 113, at 200-03, 208-11, 237-38.
119. See id. at 234-37.
120. See CRESS, supra note 111, at 8-9, 11, 36-38, 47; GREENE, supra note 114, at 83-84.
121. See CRESS, supra note Ill, at 60-61; ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 51-53.
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interests."n Thus, the army desired foreign wars to justify its existence, ample
taxation to support it, a strong executive to collect the taxes, and docile citizens
to pay the taxes.1 3 The American republican Joel Barlow, in denouncing
European systems of government, put the idea pithily: "Thus money is required
to levy armies, and armies to levy money; and foreign wars are introduced as
the pretended occupation for both."" Soldiers thus contributed to the break-
down of the common good in much the same way that any other professional
group did. In addition, a standing army posed a special threat: it controlled the
means of force."2 As society developed and diversified, many ignominiously
chose to surrender the sword to a professional army. As a consequence, those
who surrendered the sword to the standing army gained a luxurious way of life
but lost their moral character and their only guarantee of liberty in the bar-
gain. t26
2. The Militia, the Balance of Estates, and Centralization
In republican theory, the militia offered protection against all of these
dangers. 27 The militia was viewed as the universal people armed-the whole
people, the republic. This armato populato did have one limit: it included only
citizens, not all residents."n Within this limit, however, the militia reflected
the most populist strand of republican thinking. To republican thinkers, identifi-
122. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 9; CRESS, supra note 111, at 19; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 430-
32.
123. See ELBRIDGE GERRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION (1788), reprinted in PAM-
PHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE
PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 10 (Paul L. Ford ed., Da Capo 1968) (1888); Fletcher, supra note 110, at 6, 12;
POCOCK, supra note 44, at 409-13, 430.
124. JOEL BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE 44
(1956).
125. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 4, 9; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 199-200.
126. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 6; CRESS, supra note 111, at 19; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 203-
04 (Florentine origin of idea). Barlow claimed that when the people lay down their arms, they "lose at once
the power of protecting themselves, and of discerning the cause of their oppression" because doing so
"palsies the hand and brutalizes the mind." BARLOW, supra note 124, at 45.
127. Many republicans believed that the militia offered another advantage: it would be more effective
against foreign enemies than would a professional army because it fought for home and hearth, rather than
for lucre. See MORGAN, supra note 78, at 154-56; Fletcher, supra note 110, at 9, 17; CRESS, supra note
Ill, at 43-44. In fact, however, militias were never very effective, especially against trained bands and
especially given the increasing sophistication of warfare in the 18th century. See MORGAN, supra note 78,
at 160-62. By the 1780's most Americans had come to perceive the militia's shortcomings. See ROYSTER,
supra note 67, at 37; CRESS, supra note 111, at 58-59. Americans still quarreled over the appropriate role
of an army, but the basis of the disagreement had shifted. Opponents now argued not that an army was less
effective than a militia but that it was more effective, and thus posed a threat to liberty. The militia was
perhaps less proficient, but it was virtuous. See CRESS, supra note 111, at 75-93.
128. See Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear
Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 25, 29 (1984). In the 19th century, states often limited militia membership to
whites, but colonial practice typically included African-American citizens. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra
note 17, at 37-40. Today, the citizenry comprises a much greater proportion of the population than it did
in the 1780's, and a modern analogue to the militia would thus include a vastly greater proportion of the
population as well. I consider the intellectual difficulties attending such an expansion in Part IV.A.I-2.
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cation of the militia and the people made the militia incomparably more
attractive than a standing army.
Initially, the existence of a citizen militia was thought to limit the threat
of executive usurpation. From the beginning of the tradition, theorists had
closely identified the militia with the Many, to give the Many a check on the
monarchical and aristocratic elements of government.'29 By the 1780's, how-
ever, the balance of estates had come to be less central to Americans. Republi-
cans had moved toward purer democracy, and military forces had been under
the control of legislatures. 3
A new issue, however, soon replaced concern about executive usurpation:
fear of the excessive concentration of power in the central government. This
fear went to the heart of the debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
over the adoption of the new Constitution. Traditionally, militia forces were
local bodies, and prior to the 1790's, republicans generally believed that this
proximity to the people would prevent their capture by malignant governmental
actors.'3 ' By the 1790's, however, many had lost faith in the local militia. At
times the militia had sided with the troublemakers in domestic insurrections
after the Revolution. Many concluded that these insurrections were not legiti-
mate forms of resistance, but constituted sedition against legitimate authority;
it followed that the militia might also be seditious.132 Abandoning trust in the
militia 33 (and contrary to received republican wisdom), 34 the Framers of
the Constitution gave Congress power to raise a standing army and to regulate
state militias. 31
The Federalist defense of this decision was even more alarming. In star-
tlingly unrepublican fashion, Alexander Hamilton argued for the creation of a
strong and modern state, distinct from its population, with sufficient means to
129. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 110, at 16; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 87-91 (Leonardo Bruni);
id. at 196-99, 202-03, 210-11 (Machiavelli); id. at 389-91 (Harrington).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83. In line with the new emphasis on democracy, writers
argued that popular government must depend on a popular militia. See, e.g., BARLOW, supra note 124, at
46; Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599, 602, 605-
06 (1982) (quoting republican thinkers).
131. See Carp, supra note 113, at 19-20; see also CRESS, supra note 111, at 4-6 (specifying local nature
of militia).
132. See CRESS, supra note 111, at 95-96, 128; Carp, supra note 113, at 32; Richard D. Brown, Shay's
Rebellion and the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in Massachusetts, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION
113-15 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
133. See, e.g., CRESS, supra note 111, at 71-73.
134. See REGINALD C. STUART, WAR AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 50 (1982); Carp, supra note 113, at
33-34; CRESS, supra note 111, at 95-97.
135. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16; Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1495-96 (1987); Carp, supra note 113, at 32-33; CRESS, supra note I 11, at 97; STUART, supra
note 134, at 59-63. In particular, Congress was given the power "[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the
United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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carry out its will.136 In particular, a standing army would be necessary to repel
foreign invasion because "[w]ar, like most other things, is a science to be
acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by prac-
tice. ' 137 More disturbingly, this standing army might be turned against the
states themselves: "If [an] insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a
principal part of it, the employment of a different [non-militia] force might
become unavoidable."' 3 The alternative, in Hamilton's mind, was chaos.
With no firm hand from above, individual states or regions would inevitably
erupt in constant civil war.139
For Anti-Federalist republicans, such sentiments were like a fireball in the
night. They feared that the new central government would be dominated by the
Few, distant from the people, and lustful for power t40 Hamilton's writings
seemed to promise that the government would use its army in repressive ways.
The Anti-Federalists had not lost faith in the virtue of a people's militia,
1 41
and they resisted the Constitution because it would take power away from the
local legislatures, which were more democratic and more devoted to the
common good. 142 Even some Federalist defenses of the new government
implicitly accepted the republican premise that the militia is the ultimate
bulwark of virtue. Madison, for example, argued that if the federal government
sought to subvert the militia, the states retained the constitutional power to
protect it. So if Congress should ever use standing armies to advance tyrannical
designs, they would be outnumbered and outfought by liberty-loving militia
members. 43
These reassurances were not, however, enough to allay the fears of Anti-
Federalist republicans, and a number of state legislatures approved the Constitu-
tion with recommendations that Congress adopt a bill of rights. Virtually all
of these proposals included some version of the right to arms, with a range of
components: some sought to return complete control of the militia to the states,
some sought to ban standing armies, but all sought to guarantee the right of the
136. Indeed, Isaac Kramnick argues that before the Federalists, American thinkers had no modern
conception of the state; in that sense, Hamilton was engaged in creating an American state for the first time.
See Kramnick, supra note 13, at 67-72. (The republicans did have a concept of government, and I have
loosely used the term "state" to refer to their notion of government. See supra notes 12-13.)
137. TIE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton).
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
139. See id.
140. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 487-96; MORGAN, supra note 78, at 276-87.
141. Indeed, the new republic initially saw remarkably little change in military policy. See Carp, supra
note 113, at 35-37. Despite Federalist proposals for a federal select militia, Congress provided for a universal
militia under state control. Id. at 36-37; CRESS, supra note 111, at 119-21. At the end of the Revolution,
the Newburgh conspiracy and the Society of Cincinnati revived fears of a standing army, see CRESS, supra
note I 11, at 67-71; ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 345-57, and republicans used the old rhetoric throughout
the 1790's to denounce any armed force other than a universal militia. See CRESS, supra note I 1l, at 127-34,
137-49.
142. See CRESS, supra note 111, at 98-102.
143. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison); Amar, supra note 135, at 1496-97.
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people to keep and bear arms.' 44 Supporters of the Second Amendment thus
inscribed faith in the local militia-not liberal concern about individual self-
defense-into the Constitution: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed."
The Second Amendment therefore sought to protect local democracy by
protecting popular, public military bodies. The states would always have an
armed populace from which they could form a militia. The federal government
could regulate the use of that militia, but could not disarm or disband it. As
a result, state militias could always check the distant politicians in Washing-
ton. 145 On military policy, the text of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
are thus chronologically inverted compared to the general development of
political ideas: the 1787 Constitution represented the new liberal mood, and the
1792 Second Amendment the older republican tradition. 46
3. The Militia and Universality
Overconcentration of power in the central government was not, however,
the only fear from which the militia offered protection. Republicans hoped that
the militia would check state government as well as federal: state constitutions,
too, contained right to arms provisions. Many hoped that Congress itself would
rely on a militia, rather than on a standing army. 4' Even apart from its asso-
ciation with local governments, therefore, the militia promised virtuous control
of force.
This trust in the virtue of the militia rested on its rhetorical identification
with the whole of the citizenry-an equation with three significant conceptual
results. The first focused on the character of the American public: because the
citizenry was or could be virtuous, the militia was or could be virtuous. 4
Second, as militia members were citizens and property holders, they had a stake
in the well-being of the republic-unlike mercenaries or professional soldiers,
who were committed only to their own fortunes. 49
Most important, the militia would be virtuous because it was thought to
include all of the citizens of the republic. By definition, this universality
144. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 72-75; Cress, supra note 128, at 35-36; Shalhope, supra note
130, at 608-10.
145. Akhil Amar also argues that the Second Amendment provides an important linguistic gloss on
Congress' military powers under Article I. In the republican tradition, an army was composed of soldiers
for hire, as opposed to a militia, which was conscripted from the general public. As a result, Congress'
power to raise an "army" involves authority only to enlist soldiers, not conscript them. See Amar, supra
note 103, at 1163-75.
146. Cf. Carp, supra note 113, at 35 (the "passage of the Second Amendment... clearly reveals
America's divided mind on military policy").
147. See CRESS, supra note Ill, at 78-87.
148. See Henry Knox, General Knox's Militia Plait, 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2088-89 (1790).
149. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 9: Cress, supra note 128, at 29.
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reflected the common good, rather than the good of a narrow slice of society.
The militia was nothing more or less than the whole people in their military
capacity.15 0 Americans incessantly repeated this theme-rather than the impor-
tance of individual self-defense-in support of the militia and the Second
Amendment. State proposals for the Amendment typically described the militia
as "the body of the people"1 5'-a phrase denoting the whole or the bulk of
the community. I5 2 Richard Henry Lee explained: "A militia, when properly
formed, are in fact the people themselves ... 153 Similarly, George Mason
asked: "Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a
few public officers." 54 In a much-quoted passage, Patrick Henry maintained:
"The great object [of the Second Amendment] is, that every man be
armed."'155
As the people, the militia could not act against the general good because
the general good and their good were one and the same. Tench Coxe declaimed:
"THE POWERS OF THE SWORD ARE IN THE HANDS OF THE YEO-
MANRY OF AMERICA FROM SIXTEEN TO SIXTY .... Who are the
militia? are they not ourselves. Is it feared, then, that we shall turn our arms
each man against his own bosom."'56 Samuel Adams argued: "The Militia
is composed of free Citizens. There is therefore no Danger of their making use
of their Power to the destruction of their own Rights, or suffering other to
invade them."'57 To be universal, the militia must comprise all of the citizen-
ry. Republican writings, of the Anti-Federalist period and before, therefore
insisted that the whole people should be armed, and contrasted this universality
with the partiality of a standing army or a select militia.158
150. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 414. As I will discuss, actual Anglo-American militias were never
truly universal, but the militias of republican rhetoric, theory, and aspiration nearly always were.
Recently, Elaine Scarry has connected this insistence on the universal distribution of arms with social
contract rhetoric. Social contract theory requires not only the "threshold consent" to the original contract
but also the "perpetual consent" of the population to government through voting, the amendment process,
and willingness to go to war;, the concentration of arms in a single group, however, would lead to the
coercive dominance of society by that group and would destroy the possibility of a government limited by
the consent of the population. See Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution,
and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1276-89 (1991).
151. Cress, supra note 128, at 29-30, 36; see also id. at 29-30; Shalhope, supra note 130, at 608-09.
152. See MAIER, supra note 113, at 35-36.
153. RICHARD H. LEE, ADDITIONAL LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER 169 (New York, 1788).
154. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 425-26 (Jonathan Elliot ed., B. Franklin 1968)
(2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter DEBATES].
155. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 74 (emphasis added).
156. A Pennsylvanian, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETrE, Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Microfilm Supp.) 1778-1780 (Kaminski & Saladino eds.,
1981) [hereinafter A Pennsylvanian]. Decades before, an English pamphleteer made the same point: "The
Militia must, and can never be otherwise than for English Liberty, because else it doth destroy itself, but
a standing Force can be for nothing but Prerogative, by whom it hath its idle living and Subsistence."
POCOCK, supra note 44, at 410; see also CRESS, supra note 111, at 3, 43-45.
157. 3 SAMUEL ADAMS, WRITINGS 251 (Henry A. Cushing, ed., 1906).
158. See LEE, supra note 153, at 169; ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT
155-57 (London, 1698); Fletcher, supra note 110, at 18-21; BARLOW, supra note 124, at 46: CRESS, supra
note 111, at 100; HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 69-74 (1984); Cress, supra note 128, at 31-32. For the Anti-
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The republican militia member was thus envisioned as the quintessentially
unspecialized citizen, Horatio at the Plow, whose own interests reflected the
general good. At one moment, he controlled policy in his enfranchised role;
at another, he controlled resources in his propertied role; and at a third, he
controlled force in his armed role.159 Indeed, for some republicans the citizen's
status as militia member may have been more significant than his status as
voter, because it was a more direct exercise of self-government. Most American
republicans conceded that direct democracy on any scale was impracticable,
but understood that by foregoing such immediate citizen participation in
government, they lost an important part of the republican tradition.160 After
the Federalists managed to make representation even more ephemeral, the
citizen as franchise holder was left still further from the reins of governmental
power. As a militia member, however, the citizen could still directly participate
in politics by intimidating would-be despots and demagogues."'
The militia's two features-decentralization and universality-can thus be
separated, and they are each independently important. But they are not in fact
radically distinct, because both proceed from the same fear that a small group
of powerful citizens (in an oligarchic central government) could come to
dominate the republic by control of the means of coercion (held by a select
militia or standing army). The solution was to vest arms in a universal body
under the control of democratic local legislatures.
4. The Militia and Training in Virtue
The virtue of the militia therefore rested upon and reflected the virtue of
the citizenry as a whole, because they were one and the same. But the militia
Federalists, the primary demon on this point was probably Hamilton, who insisted that the people should
surrender liberty for wealth: a universal militia would be impracticable becaue "lilt would form an
[enormous] annual deduction from the annual labour of the country ... "THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 184
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 196 1). In the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, John Smilie
responded: "Congress may give us a select militia which will, in fact, be a standing army .... When a
select militia is formed; the people in general may be disarmed." A Pennsylvanian, supra note 156, at 1778-
80.
159. JOHN TRENCHARD & 'WALTER MOYLE, AN ARGUMENT SHEWING, THAT A STANDING ARMY Is
INCONSISTENT wIH A FREE GOVERNMENT, AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ENGLISH MONARCHY 7 (London, 1697); CRESS, supra note 11, at 19. One of the best examples of this
view was the creation of the utopian Georgia Colony by English philanthropists. They sought to prevent
the development of self-interest and to promote virtue by restricting the market in land and labor. Instead
of economic activity, "[t]he chief form of group participation would be military service, which was required
of all adult male inhabitants." J.E. CROWLEY, THIS SHEBA, SELF: THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC
LIFE IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 20-21 (1974).
160. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 517-21.
161. As Akhil Amar has demonstrated, the citizen's role as juror served much the same end by giving
him a direct hand in the administration of justice. Indeed, the similarities between the jury's role and the
militia's are striking. Like the militia, the jury was dialogic and deliberative in considering whether to nullify
the law, especially if deemed unconstitutional, see Amar, supra note 103, at 1191-95; it provided training
in virtue and self-government, see id. at 1186-87; it was populist, see id. at 1187-89, and localist, see id.
at 1186; and it functioned as a protection against tyranny, see id. at 1183-85.
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was more than a passive mirror of society; it also acted upon its members to
instill civic virtue. As noted before, the virtuous citizen was expected to stand
apart from the state to criticize and correct it when it began to fall into corrup-
tion. Yet, he was expected to simultaneously subordinate his particularistic
interests to the good of the state as long as the state stayed on the paths of
virtue. t6 To do so, the citizen had to judge when he could refuse the de-
mands of the state as corrupt, but he could not let his own separate interests
cloud his judgment. Property helped the citizen to balance these conflicting
responsibilities, by giving him independence of judgment as well as a stake in
the well-being of the republic. 63 Service in the militia was yet another means
of training the citizenry to civic virtue.
The self-sacrificial aspects of militia service were obvious. Membership
was service to the state that always disrupted one's chosen round of activities
and often involved hunger, cold, disease, and danger.'1" The militia member
was expected to bear these burdens with the knowledge that he was keeping
the republic safe. The experience of working together with fellow citizens could
cement this perspective of self-sacrifice to the common good. Militia service
required cooperation among citizens and subordination to orders, stimulated a
commitment to comrades that would become a devotion to the public that they
represented, and was filled with exhortation to virtue in sermons and speech-
es."6 Many veterans of the Revolution recalled military service as the emo-
tional high point of their lives; by the 1780's they yearned for the "rage
militaire" that drew Americans together in the war.'66
Militia service also served to engender virtue by inducing the experience
of independent self-government. In republican theory, arms and property
constituted the necessary material bases for the autonomous political personality
of the citizen, who was dependent for his safety and livelihood only on the
body of his fellow citizens, not on the state apparatus nor on particular private
individuals. 67 Conscious that they directly held the reins of coercive power,
the people would never accept that governors governed and citizens obeyed.
As Joel Barlow explained, "A people that legislate for themselves ought to be
in the habit of protecting themselves; or they will lose the spirit of both."' 68
Thus, republican commentators denounced those supine peoples who, for
162. See infra Part III.B.6.
163. See supra note 71; text accompanying note 149; infra text accompanying notes 287-288.
164. This advantage is prominent in proposals for modal militias. Henry Knox, the first Secretary of
War, presented to Congress a militia plan which emphasized that the conditions of service should be dreadful
in order to accustom militia members to self-sacrifice. Knox, supra note 148, at 2088, 2100-01; see also
Fletcher, supra note 110, at 20-24 (suggesting use of camps to train young men to become soldiers);
POCOCK, supra note 44, at 201-02 (noting Machiavelli's belief that militia training induced virtue).
165. See Knox, supra note 148, at 2090, 2099-2101; Fletcher, supra note 110, at 20-24.
166. See ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 25, 31.
167. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 203-04, 210-11, 385-86; CRESs, supra note 111, at 16-17, 23-24,
49.
168. BARLOW, supra note 124, at 47.
[Vol. 101: 551
Second Amendment
comfort and convenience, surrendered their arms-along with their liberty-to
a standing army,169 and expressed admiration for the independent, "manly,"
civil but not servile citizen-soldier-freeholder, committed to the common good
but not enslaved to the state.170
5. The Rights of Resistance and Revolution
To entrust the means of force to the militia was thus to entrust it to the
body most likely to use it in virtuous ways. This commitment of force to virtue
was thought to have two important results. First, quite apart from any actual
act of resistance, the knowledge that citizens possessed arms was likely to affect
the behavior of both state officials and citizens. State officials would be loathe
to trifle with the people's liberties, knowing that citizens had the wherewithal
to defend those liberties.17 ' In contrast, republicans drew from history the
lesson that when despots sought to undo a republic, they began by disarming
militia members. 172 Republican thinkers also believed that possession of arms
changed the character of the people as well, making them more independent,
more suspicious of their government, and less willing to tolerate the slightest
tyranny. It was difficult and frightening to resist despots and all too easy to
accept early incursions. But down that path-and not far down it-lay slav-
ery. 73 A people armed, aware of its own empowerment, would not start down
that path.
As in the case of the militia as a training ground for virtue, republicans had
some first hand experience with the benefits of the militia in resisting tyranny.
Traditionally, to enforce their decisions, colonial governments had to rely on
the posse comitatus and the militia. Colonial records are full of complaints that
the militia, reflecting the sentiment of the people, refused to enforce edicts
perceived as unjust, or even participated in popular resistance to them. 74
Colonial culture accepted some measure of violent resistance as a normal part
of life, although those in authority never ceased to complain of that fact. If the
169. See id. at 45; Fletcher. supra note I10, at 5-6.
170. See BARLOW, supra note 124, at 47; ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 28; Shalhope, supra note 130,
at 604-07.
171. The most famous exposition of this idea is Jefferson's: "[W]hat country can preserve it's [sic]
liberties, if their [sic] rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of
resistance? Let them take arms ... The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood
of patriots and tyrants." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), in JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 910, 911 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); see also TRENCHARD & MOYLE, supra note 159, at
12.
172. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 107, at 750; NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE
LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 56 (Paul
L. Ford ed., B. Franklin 1971) (1888); Shalhope, supra note 130, at 602.
173. See ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 5-7, 16.
174. See MORGAN, supra note 78, at 164; MAIER, supra note 113, at 16-26; Carp, supra note 113, at
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governors had lost touch with the people or disregarded their wishes, it seemed
natural to the people of the colonies to go outside normal channels so as to
make their will directly felt: to riot, to burn royal ships in protest of impress-
ment, to close down courthouses, to assault officials or to destroy their proper-
ty, or any of the thousand other courses of action of which their not very
obedient minds could conceive. 75
In the end, however, if the threat of force was to have any meaningful
effect, the people had to be prepared to take up arms to oust tyrannical rulers
and replace them with citizens committed to the common good. This right of
resistance is the second general result of entrusting force to the militia. It is the
only purpose of the Second Amendment explicitly mentioned during its discus-
sion in Congress. Elbridge Gerry declared: "This declaration of rights, I take
it, is intended to secure the people against the mal-administration of the Gov-
ernment."' 76 He explained that the purpose of a militia is to prevent a stand-
ing army, and that when governments intend to invade the people's liberties,
they first disarm the militia. 77 No one contradicted him or suggested a differ-
ent, liberal purpose for the provision.178
Republicans were aware of the danger implicit in vouchsafing this right of
resistance in the citizenry and sensitive to the charge that they were inciting
violence. They developed a number of limits on the right: It must be a product
of the "body" of the people, i.e., the great majority acting by consensus; it must
be a course of last resort; its inspiration must be a commitment to the common
good; and its object must be a true tyrant, committed to large-scale abuse, not
merely randomly unjust or sinful in private life.' 79
An uprising that failed to meet these criteria was considered an illegitimate
rebellion, rather than an act of true republican resistance. The American Revo-
lutionaries believed that they had direct experience with the distinction. The
War for Independence was resistance to tyranny, but the various uprisings
against the new governments-Vermont's drive for independence, the Carolina
Regulation, Shay's Rebellion, New York tenant protests, the Whiskey Rebel-
lion, and others-were all rebellions. 8° Such rebellions were no better than
175. The study of legitimate popular disturbances in colonial and Revolutionary society has generated
a substantial and growing body of historical scholarship. See, e.g., COUNTRYMAN, supra note 102; PAUL
A. GILIE, THE ROAD TO MOBOCRACY (1987); MAIER, supra note 113; ALAN TAYLOR, LIBERTY MEN AND
GREAT PROPRIETORS (1990).
176. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 107, at 749.
177. See id. at 749-750.
178. Even the Federalist Papers, written well before the adoption of the Amendment, promised that
if the central government ever used a standing army to oppress the people, "[t]o these would be opposed
a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from
among themselves, fighting for their common liberties and united and conducted by [state] governments
possessing their affections and confidence." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
179. See MAIER, supra note 113, at 36-39; STUART, supra note 134, at 19-21.
180. See Carp, supra note 113, at 32; THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE 'WHISKEY REBELLION 44-45, 48
(1986).
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tyranny, and the rebel forces little different from standing armies, inasmuch as
they pursued a partial interest rather than the common good. 81 This threat
to the commonweal could come as easily from a demagogue as from a despot,
and the universal militia was supposed to suppress insurrections by private
groups as well as usurpations by public ministers.182 In resisting a tyrant, the
militia was acting against the state apparatus, and in suppressing a rebellion it
was acting for the same apparatus, but in either case it was pursuing the
common good.
Traditionally, the republican function of the militia may have been limited
to this right of resistance, rather than to a true right of revolution. The former
is characteristic of more hierarchical forms of republicanism; the people had
the right, when abused, to replace tyrants or to eliminate demagogues acting
against the common good. t83 By contrast, it is yet a further step to grant the
people a right of revolution,' 4 a right to reorder society top to bottom, "to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organiz-
ing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness." 85 But in practice, the line between resistance and
revolution was not sharp; once the American revolutionaries had rejected British
rule, they were of necessity compelled to put a new form of government in its
place, and accordingly rewrote their state constitutions to provide for democratic
government in the interest of the common good.'86 Thus, by war's end, Amer-
ican republicans had come to embrace a right of revolution along with a right
of resistance.
181. In particular cases, Americans disagreed whether a domestic disturbance was a rebellion or a
revolution. The insurgents self-consciously saw themselves as continuing the work of the American
Revolution and used republican rhetoric to describe their efforts. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 180, at 31-34,
39, 47-48, 54, 127-30. Other Americans believed that the rebels acted out of selfish, venal motives.
SLAUGHTER, supra note 180, at 39, 44-45, 48, 58; see also Cress, supra note 128, at 40 (discussing popular
distrust of venal motives of militia members). Still others, in rejecting the rebellions, began to modify the
republicanism of the 1770's, emphasizing order over liberty, nationalism over decentralization, and hierarchy
over democracy. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 180, at 133-38. All agreed, however, that some insurrections
were rebellions against legitimate government.
182. See Cress, supra note 128, at 23; TRENCHARD & MOYLE, supra note 159, at 7; CRESs, supra note
Ill, at 9, 111; MORGAN, supra note 78, at 156; POCOCK, supra note 44, at 203-04, 210-11. New
Hampshire's draft proposal for what became the Second Amendment provided: "Congress shall never disarm
any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion." See Shalhope, supra note 130, at 608.
183. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 20-23. Older republicans believed in the importance of revolution,
but less in the sense of popular armed upheaval than in the sense of cyclical return to political health. See
supra note 73.
184. I use the phrase "right to revolution" because of its common acceptance, despite the fact that a
constitutional right to revolution may be nonsensical, as if the Constitution secured a right to destroy it by
arms. More appropriately, perhaps, one may speak of a natural right to revolution and a constitutional right
to possess the means of revolution. The Second Amendment, then, does not protect a right of revolution
(with judges deciding when and how the citizenry may revolt), but does preserve the possibility of revolution
(with the citizens deciding when to implement that possibility).
185. THE DECLARAION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
186. See WOOD, supra note 56, at 282-291. A 1788 letter by Anti-Federalist Luther Martin illustrates
this unconscious conflation of resistance and revolution in the minds of the Anti-Federalists: "By the
principles of the American revolution, arbitrary power may, and ought to, be resisted even by arms, if
necessary." I DEBATES, supra note 154, at 382 (emphasis added).
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Lockean liberals also endorsed a right of revolution, so that unadorned
references to such a right in the 1780's could be either liberal or republican.
In theory, a liberal right to revolution might differ substantially from a republi-
can one. According to liberals, individuals enter the social contract for their
own ends, reserving certain rights of autonomy; if the government violates those
rights, citizens may take up arms to insist upon the original terms.187 By
contrast, a republican revolution is made not for a cumulation of individual ends
but for a truly common good."88 In the 1780's, however, the line between the
two was not so distinct.189 Republicans may have borrowed the ideas of the
social compact and the right of revolution in part from Locke's circle tg° be-
fore converting them into an idiom of the common good. For republicans,
moreover, an important part of the commonweal was the liberty of citizens to
ensure their political independence. 91
As a result, the Anti-Federalist framers of the Second Amendment may not
have thought consciously about whether they were relying on liberal or republi-
can rights of revolution. Indeed, they may have relied on both rights without
worrying about inconsistency. 192 But in context, their primary loyalty seems
clear. They self-consciously cast themselves as defenders of the War for
Independence, a revolution made for republican principles. They gave the right
to bear arms to a militia-a sacred concept in the republican tradition but one
that Locke does not even mention. 93 They feared a central government creat-
ed to protect Lockean accumulation of property and dominated by economic
elites. And they sought to return the means of coercion to universal bodies of
virtuous citizens under the direction of local democratic legislatures.
187. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, reprinted in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
473-77 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
188. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 described itself as "a social compact, by
which the whole people covenants with each Citizen, and each Citizen with the whole people, that all shall
be governed by certain Laws for the common good." MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl., reprinted in 1
AMERICAN CoNsTrrrUiONs 621 (Franklin B. Hough ed., Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co., 1871).
189. Thus, Carl Becker read the Declaration of Independence as thoroughly Lockean, see CARL
BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1942), and Gary Wills as not at all Lockean, see GARY
WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978).
190. See WOOD, suipra note 56, at 283.
191. Thus, Patrick Henry exhorted: "Guard with jealous attention the public liberty... Unfortunately,
nothing will preserve it but downright force. Whenever you give up that force, you are ruined." 3 DEBATES,
supra note 154, at 45.
192. The last 20 years have witnessed explosive disagreement among historians over Locke's influence
on revolutionary America. For a brief review of the disagreement, see KRAMNICK, supra note 84, at 35-40.
193. Some have argued that protecting the militia may have been only one purpose of the Amendment,
but I suggest that this argument rests on thin evidence. See infra Part III.A. Even if the argument is correct,
however, protecting the militia is still the only purpose that the proponents of the Amendment bothered to
mention-indicating that their central goal was republican.
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6. Coping with the Paradox
The idea of the militia thus responds to the republican paradox that without
a virtuous state there can be no virtuous citizens, but without virtuous citizens
the state will not be virtuous. It does so by eliding the distinction between state
and society. In republican thought, the militia had to be a body summoned,
trained, and organized by the state. Without state sponsorship, the militia might
not be "well regulated," nor could members gain experience in self-sacrificing
service to the state. More importantly, it was critical that the militia be some-
how universal; otherwise force would belong only to a slice of the population.
But the state alone was truly universal and could constitute the militia as a
universal organization. Without state supervision, the militia might be only a
number of partial bodies-private armies asserting their private wills. Such an
analysis reflected one horn of the paradox: to be moral, the citizen must exist
in a virtuous state, which would constitute a universal militia. So in normal
times, the militia was thought of as a state body.
But for republicans, there was danger everywhere, including state supervi-
sion of the militia. The state might become corrupt and seek to corrupt the
militia-by dismantling it, by recruiting only from a slice of society, or by
bribing its officers. In that case, the militia was expected to draw on other
aspects of its character: its independence of mind and its capacity to take
government directly into its hands. Members would remember that although
the militia was gathered by the state, it was composed of, and identified with,
the body of the people. The training in virtue acquired under a benign state
would now stand it in good stead in resisting a corrupt one. Such a state of
affairs could not last for long. Without the frame of a republic to hold them
together, the pieces of a people would become disjointed, devolving into pursuit
of self-interest. Republicans hoped, however, that the militia could fill the gap
for the time necessary to restore political health. This analysis reflected the
other horn of the paradox: without a virtuous and independent citizenry, the
state itself will never be virtuous.
Lacking a state apparatus, citizens might succumb to the corruption of
atomism, yet with one, they might succumb to tyranny or oligarchy. The militia,
therefore, had to be ever vigilant, like pilots of a ship, trimming their sails in
response to the more pressing danger. On the one hand, should a threat come
from the state, the militia was to assume the character of society-independent,
aggressive, suspicious of public ministers. On the other hand, should a threat
arise from private groups, the militia was to bear the aspect of the state-self-
sacrificing, participatory, hostile to private power.
The militia thus helped to resolve the paradox by an impaction of all the
components of a republic into itself. If the state could not have virtue without
virtuous citizens, then the militia would supply a virtuous citizenry; and if
citizens could not have virtue without a virtuous state, then the militia would
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
provide virtuous state supervision. The danger in a right of resistance was that
the criteria were not self-applying; the line between resistance and rebellion was
often in the eye of the beholder. But eighteenth-century republicans felt that
the safest place to commit the right to judge was to the citizen militia.
III. THE MODERN MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The place of the right to arms in the republican tradition is thus central and
profound. I will argue in this section, however, that a modern republican
interpretation of the Second Amendment presents great difficulties. In Sections
A, B, and C, I argue that the republican tradition offers no guidance for judicial
mediation between the competing contemporary legal claims that the Amend-
ment only supports the modern national guard or that it also supports a private
right to arms for individual self-defense. The republican tradition justifies giving
arms to a universal militia of a type which does not exist today. As a result,
under modern conditions, the literal wording of the Second Amendment is
meaningless. On the other hand, I argue in Section D that the Amendment can
serve as a regulative ideal for courts, who could try to keep its spirit alive by
reading other provisions of the Constitution to serve the same ends-by protect-
ing property as a means to political participation or by restricting the power
of the army and police. Ultimately, however, these judicial strategies can offer
only limited change; in any event, in republican terms, the courts are not the
best fora in which to seek reinvigorated popular control. I therefore consider
in the next part other, nonjudicial options for securing the ends served by the
militia.
A. Personal Right to Self-Defense
The republican tradition does not support a personal right to own arms for
self-defense. The republicans were intensely political and saw the right to arms
as a political phenomenon. The contrary vision typically espoused by the
advocates of a private right to arms could hardly be more different: each man's
home is his castle, and he has a natural right to defend himself, his family, and
his property against threats from the outside world.'94 This vision, embracing
frontier self-reliance and rugged individualism, is a deep part of American
tradition,19 5 but not the American republican tradition.'9 6 Whatever else may
194. See, e.g., B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INTEREST 37,41, 61-62 (1976);
Kates, supra note 8, at 206; Levinson, supra note 2, at 643 n.37, 655-57; Lund, supra note 16, at 117-21.
195. See, e.g.. DAVID B. DAVIS, FROM HOMICIDE TO SLAVERY 41-72 (1986).
196. The frontier tradition did, however, adopt some of the cultural forms of republicanism: the
republican yeoman was self-reliant, and he did have his own farm, far away from cities. But these attributes
were valuable because they helped him to be a better political participant. In the 19th-century frontier
tradition, that ideal slowly changed until rugged individualism became an end in itself; Americans valued
those who could take care of themselves without the aid of others. See generally HENRY N. SMITH, VIRGIN
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be laid at the door of republicans, they are not responsible for the National
Rifle Association or its individualist vision.
As it is virtually impossible to prove a negative, I cannot claim that none
of the proponents of the Second Amendment ever embraced a nonrepublican
belief in the right to own arms for self-defense. Yet the dominance of the
republican tradition in their thinking about the Amendment makes it unlikely
that the primary concern of the provision was self-defense.197 As I have ar-
gued, the discussion of the right to arms was saturated with republican concepts
and rhetoric, including the language of the provision itself, with its assertion
that "a well regulated militia" is "necessary to the security of a free State." The
references to a popular right of resistance are countless; in contrast, the refer-
ences to an individual right to arms for self-defense are quite rare.19 I do not
mean to argue that one could not construct a modern constitutional argument
for a right to own arms for self-defense, 99 or that all eighteenth-century re-
LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH (1950). It is this image to which individual rights
advocates seem to appeal.
197. Akhil Amar and Elaine Scarry have recently advanced a similar argument. See Amar, supra note
103, at 1164; Scarry, supra note 150, at 1260-86.
198. Robert Shalhope has argued that the Framers blended the right to arms for self-defense and for
service in the militia. In support, he adduces a number of passages that laud the ideal of the armed citizen
without specifically mentioning whether that citizen was inside the militia or outside. But, aside from the
ability to resist tyranny, those passages describe only two benefits from private ownership of arms: the
militia and the posse comitatus could help to keep order, and arms bearing was a part of a hardy, indepen-
dent life that would keep Americans committed to spartan virtue, unlike the luxury-loving peoples of Europe.
See Shalhope, supra note 130, at 604-12. Neither of these benefits directly supports a personal right to own
arms for self-defense: the former assumes that the citizen will help to keep order, but as part of the militia
or posse comitatus, not as a private individual; and while arms bearing may bring independent, virtuous
character, that association says nothing about the use to which arms should be put-revolution or self-
defense. Indeed, the hope that arms bearing will produce virtue in the citizenry could as easily be part of
the tradition that armed service to the state trains citizens to independence and self-sacrifice.
The other historical materials commonly claimed to demonstrate an individual right to self-defense
are Pennsylvania's and Vermont's constitutions, which speak of the citizens' right to own arms "for the
defence of themselves and of the state." See Shalhope, supra note 130, at 608; Hardy, supra note 29, at
595-96, 603. But other state provisions speak only of the "defence of the state," see Hardy, supra note 29,
at 596-97, and the Second Amendment with its sole reference to the "militia" more resembles this category.
Finally, the Senate did reject a proposal that the Amendment include the phrase "for the common defense,"
although it did so without explanation. Hardy, supra note 29, at 611. As the provision already included a
purpose clause-providing for the militia-the Senate could readily have concluded that it did not need
another redundant one.
199. Such an argument might proceed along two lines. First, as a moral matter, since we do not now
have a republican society, it is important that out-groups be able to protect themselves against an oppressive
state and the terrorism of in-groups. Most saliently, Professors Cottrol and Diamond have demonstrated the
historical importance of a right to arms to African Americans, see Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 17, at
55-56, 77-85, and have urged that from a modern African-American perspective, courts should construe
it broadly. Id. at 88-89.
Second, as a historical matter, the Framers of the 14th Amendment were more classically liberal than
the Framers of the Second Amendment. See. e.g., David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 784-85 (1991). In particular, the 1868 drafters sought
to give Southern blacks the ability to protect themselves against white terrorism. See Cottrol & Diamond,
supra note 177, at 64-67. As the Bill of Rights applies to the states only through the 14th, it may now be
appropriate to read the early guarantees in a more individualistic light. See Amar, supra note 103, at 1201-
03.
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publicans rejected such a right as a matter of general philosophy. Rather, I
mean to argue that that right was, for them, a peripheral issue in the debates
over the Second Amendment.' This secondary status is critical because, as
I will argue shortly, under modem conditions an individual right to arms is
positively counterproductive to the goals and ideals implicit in a collective right
to arms for resistance.201 As the latter was at the center of the republicans'
concern and the former on the periphery, a modern version of a republican
Second Amendment would not include a private right to arms for self-defense.
The modem implications of a private right to arms differ radically, depend-
ing on whether it is a right for resistance or a right for self-defense. Modem
analysts may assume that a private right to own arms automatically includes
a right to own arms for self-defense, but that assumption is anachronistic. 2'
The central issue in gun ownership for contemporary America is personal
protection, and its discussion revolves around two sets of private rights or
interests: the right of some individuals to be safe (or feel safe) by having guns,
and the right of others to be safe (or feel safe) from those who should not have
guns. In contrast, the central issue for the supporters of the Second Amendment
was the allocation of political power, and its discussion revolved around two
political actors, state and society, entwined in the militia.
B. The Right to Resistance Outside of a Universal Militia
Republicans believed that only a universal militia could safely hold arms,
and the Second Amendment makes this assumption express: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
Both of these arguments depend on accepting the conversion to liberalism as correct or inevitable,
but events in African-American history also counsel hesitance before doing so. Cottrol and Diamond point
out that African Americans were successful in defending themselves against white terrorism only when they
formed collective militias, not when acting as individuals. And they often felt constrained to form those
militias because they could not gain admittance to the all-white-less than universal-state militia. See
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 17, at 55-57, 77-85. Guaranteeing African Americans an individual right
of self-defense may be a second-best option, but the best course seems to be the creation of a truly universal
militia-or its modern functional analogue.
200. Despite the introductory clause, the provision could guard the right to arms for multiple reasons,
see supra text accompanying note 32, and the common good for republicans typically included individual
liberties, see supra note 56. Among the more significant commentators, Don Kates and Nelson Lund have
argued that the Framers based the right to revolution on the more fundamental right to self-defense: just
as every individual has a right to resist aggression, so the people collectively have the right to resist tyranny.
Kates, supra note 8, at 245; Lund, supra note 16, at 118-20. Yet even if the drafters did believe in a right
to self-defense, it seems unlikely that they chose to protect it in the Second Amendment. The Amendment
does not say "a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state and the people having
an innate right to self-defense against private parties, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed." Furthermore, this focus on government makes sense in context. The Framers were trying
to hammer out the relationship between government and individuals, not between private parties. They had,
after all, just completed a revolution and were concerned about keeping tyranny from rearing its head again.
201. See infra Part Im.B. There, I argue that a private right to arms for resistance is inconsistent with
the militia ideal today; it is even truer, and for the same reasons, that a private right to arms for self-defense
would be inconsistent with that ideal.
202. The Supreme Court has so construed the assumption. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The key issue is thus the
meaning of the term "Militia." Those who support a states' rights view of the
militia seek to identify the Amendment's militia with the modern national
guard. 3 The guard, however, is a select body, only a fraction of the popula-
tion. In contrast, as advocates of the individual rights view have main-
tained,2" another meaning of militia was current in the 1780's: the unorga-
nized militia included every male of arms-bearing agem--essentially all the
citizenry at that time-and a vestige of that definition persists in the United
States Code to this day.1° Because the Amendment describes the right to
arms as a right of "the people" it seems probable that it used "Militia" in this
broader sense.
The republican tradition supports this broader reading: the militia had to
be universal. Any smaller body, any "select militia," suffered from the same
defects as a standing army, because it was only a segment of the citizenry. The
universal militia, by contrast, was the people under another name; 7 it could
not turn against the people because it was the people. °s As the National
Guard is not universal, it cannot serve as a substitute2 9
Republicanism would also eschew any construction of the right to arms as
a right only of the state government against the federal government, rather than
a right of the people against all government.210 The militia was a forum in
203. See supra text accompanying note 28.
204. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 8, at 214-16; Levinson, supra note 2, at 646-47; Lund, supra note
16, at 106.
205. See Carp, supra note 113, at 19-20; Kates, supra note 8, at 215.
206. See 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1988) (unorganized militia includes all males at least 17 years of age
and under 45 years of age and all female officers of National Guard).
207. Laurence Tribe seeks to avoid this conclusion by arguing that even if the Framers understood the
militia to be universal, the militia was supposed to be "well regulated." See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25,
at 299 n.6. Presumably, Tribe means to suggest that regulation may include membership restrictions. Some
regulation of the militia is consistent with republicanism: the state assembled it and supervised its training.
But limiting ownership of arms to one portion of society is precisely the form of regulation that the
Amendment did not contemplate; more likely, the provision contemplated a requirement of universal
membership. See supra Part I.B.3; Amar, supra note 103, at 1167.
208. In line with the requirement of citizen universality, women today would have to be included in
the militia because of the 19th Amendment, even if the Equal Protection Clause might not so require under
current law, cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding Selective Service Act requiring male-
only registration). A wholly male militia would represent only part of the citizenry.
209. The Guard is statutorily defined as that part of the organized state militia that is federally
recognized and funded, and that is trained and has its officers appointed under Congress' militia powers.
See 10 U.S.C. § 101(9)-(13) (1988). Far from universal, its present authorized strength is 600,000. See id.
at 3225 (Supp. 1990). For some time, the guard has exhibited the characteristics of a distinct interest group.
See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, THE NATIONAL GUARD IN POLITICS (1965). Indeed, the origin of the
Guard lies in large measure in class warfare. During the great strikes of 1877, the militia had often refused
to disperse strikers, so in later years the business community urged a remodeling of the militia to make it
more responsive to property rights. See NELL I. PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON 15, 21-22 (1987).
210. There is no reason not to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states. The argument
against incorporation, based on the collective rights theory, is that it would be incoherent to do so. Since
the Second Amendment is a right of the states, it must be a restriction on the federal government, not on
the states themselves. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25, at 299 n.6. But the premise is mistaken: the Amend-
ment is a right of the people against government and against private factions. There is thus no reason to
distinguish the Amendment from the other nine for incorporation purposes.
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which state and people merged, in which society could check state corruption
and the state could check private corruption. The right to arms is not a right
of the state alone, nor a right of persons alone, but a right of the militia, which
embraces both. The Amendment may give states the right to block efforts of
the federal government to dismantle their militias. But it also gives the people
the right to intimidate state government and ultimately to revolt.
The history of the clause supports this view: the Second Amendment was
copied from right to arms provisions in state constitutions,21 1 and the debates
at the time reveal no suggestion that the scope of the right changed when
adopted into the federal Bill of Rights. But state bills of rights were not a limit
on Congress' ability to tamper with state militias; they were a limit on state
governments' ability to tamper with citizens. So the state right to arms-and
by implication the federal right as well-had to be a right of the people against
government.21 2
By the same token, however, those who support an individual rights view
of the Amendment are mistaken in equating the people's militia and the uni-
verse of private gun owners. For one thing, the militia not only may be univer-
sal; it must be, because any smaller body would reflect only a partial interest.
The threat of corruption may lurk as much in insurrection by private force as
in governmental tyranny. Second, while the militia must not be dominated by
the state, it also must not be wholly private.
Participation in the militia gave citizens an education in civic virtue,
prompting them to associate possession of weapons with service to the republic.
They also learned to be independent, but as a political body devoted to the
common good, not as private individuals. They were independent not from the
world, but from whatever forces were seeking at the moment to corrupt the
republic-whether state ministers or popular demagogues.213
Gun owners today do not comprise a universal militia. Not all citizens own
guns. Some people in almost every demographic category own guns, but
ownership is concentrated in a fairly distinctive group. American gun owners
are overwhelmingly male214 and married,215 more Protestant than Catho-
211. See Cress, supra note 128, at 29-37; HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 64-66, 75-76.
212. See Hardy, supra note 29, at 594, 624 (making similar point from individual rights perspective).
213. Advocates of the individual rights view do not sufficiently take account of these aspects of the
militia. For example, Don Kates reviews the colonial legislation that obliged all citizens to be militia
members, see Kates, supra note 8, at 215, and then asserts that the right to own arms therefore belongs to
every private party, see id. at 217-18. But we do not oblige every citizen to be a militia member today, and
that change is important.
214. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1987, at 169 tbl.
2.50 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Katherine M. Jamieson eds., 1988) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]; JAMES D.
WRIGHT ET AL, UNDERTHE GUN 109 (1983); American Firearms Industry Dealer Survey (1988) [hereinafter
Industry Survey] (unpublished survey, on file with author).
215. See Industry Survey, supra note 214.
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lic,216 more white than black (in absolute numbers)," 7 generally middle
class,218 and reside primarily in rural areas.219 Many more people own guns
in the South than elsewhere in the nation,220 and within the South, white gun
owners exhibit greater hostility to blacks than do white nonowners.Y Ameri-
cans own guns for a variety of reasons, 2 but I have observed that those who
view gun owning as political expression do so for specific reasons. 223 Among
themselves, such owners often wistfully talk about a revolution against the
government to restore a time in which people like them-honest, self-reliant,
simple people-would again have their due.' Such people may believe that
their welfare is equivalent to the common good, but it is not.' If we have
an armed revolution, it will be in the interests of these citizens, not of the
population as a whole.
216. See WRIGHT ET AL., snpra note 214, at 108; James D. Wright & Linda L. Marston, The Ownership
of the Means of Destruction: Weapons in the United States, 23 SOC. PROBS. 93, 95-98 (1975); SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 214, at 169 tbl. 2.50.
217. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 214, at 169 tbl. 2.50; Wright & Marston, supra note 216, at 95,
97-98. While white gun owners may outnumber black gun owners in absolute terms, the relative rates of
ownership among the two groups may be comparable. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 214, at 108-09. But
absolute numbers, not the percentage rate, would be the critical fact should a revolution occur: more white
gun owners means more white power.
218. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 214, at 107-08; Wright & Marston, supra note 216, at 95-97;
Industry Survey, supra note 214; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 214, at 169 tbl. 2.50.
219. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 214, at 104-105; Wright & Marston, supra note 216, at 95.
220. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 214, at 169 tbl. 2.50; WRIGHT, supra note 214, at 106-07; Wright
& Marston, supra note 216, at 95.
221. See Wright & Marston, supra note 216, at 98 & n.8.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 226-28.
223. I have been unable to find statistics to support this claim, but evidence of this subculture is not
difficult to find. For example, at present, my local country music station is playing a song called A Country
Boy Can Survive: it proudly asserts that, come the revolution, rural people will be better off than now
because, inter alia, they know how to use guns.
224. Some empirical work suggests that gun ownership is largely a function of early socialization into
a "gun culture" that is "best typified as rural rather than urban," "heavily masculine," and that "emphasizels]
independence, self-sufficiency, mastery over nature, closeness to the land, and so on." WRIGHT, supra note
214, at 112-14. Bruce-Briggs, too, suggests that gun ownership reflects a deep cultural cleavage in the
nation:
[W]e are experiencing a sort of low-grade war going on between two alternative views of what
America is and ought to be. On the one side are those who take bourgeois Europe as a model
of civilized society ....
On the other side is a group of people who do not tend to be especially articulate or
literate, and whose world view is rarely expressed in print. Their model is that of the independent
frontiersman who takes care of himself and his family with no interference from the state ....
Manhood means responsibility and caring for your own.
Bruce-Briggs, supra note 194, at 61. Levinson also recognizes this cultural division and argues that good
republicans should include gun owners as a "voice from the margin" in constitutional dialogue. See
Levinson, supra note 2, at 658-59. But for republicans, armsbearers are never just one more voice in the
dialogue; they always have the last word.
225. Their attitudes are, however, interestingly parallel to those of some in the English Country Party
in the 18th century. Both pined for a past time when the citizens of the republic were homogeneous, and
the public good was therefore identical to their own good. See supra note 86. The Country Party was wrong
then, and these gun owners are wrong now: the public good must include their good, but it must also include
the good of others in equal measure.
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Gun owners, moreover, have not formed a militia: they have not assembled
into a collective body to acquire training in virtue or the habit of associating
arms bearing with dedication to the common good. Many urban dwellers
probably have little experience with guns but own one for self-defense; they
associate firearms with fear of their fellow citizens, not militia sorority.?16
Most gun owners use their firearms primarily for hunting,2 7 and these owners
may feel some bond with other hunters, but only with other hunters.' And
then some-the "survivalists"--own guns precisely because they predict that
a cataclysmic event, such as an invasion or a revolution, is in the offing.
Among themselves, survivalists may display some qualities of a militia: they
are trained, vigilant, and committed to each other. But they have no bond to
the rest of the republic; indeed, they suspect that most others will, and perhaps
should, perish in the coming conflagration. Despite the self-image of gun
groups, then, a gun is not like an amulet; it does not have magical properties
that convert its owner into a model republican citizen.
The eighteenth-century republicans were ready to face great risk, but they
were far from insensible to danger. They believed in a right of resistance, but
they gave it not to some random collection of individuals but to the people as
a whole and only as a whole. My disagreement with a private right interpreta-
tion of the Amendment is not that it takes the provision too seriously, but that
it does not take it seriously enough. The vision of the Amendment is not of a
nation in which all may own arms but of one in which all are in fact armed.
If only a small portion go armed, the hope of the Amendment will have failed
as surely as if the government had prohibited arms bearing altogether. Corrup-
tion-domination of politics by a narrow slice of the public-can occur through
the machinations not only of the state but of private parties as well. The undue
political influence of the National Rifle Association is precisely the nightmare
of all true republicans, all true believers in the Second Amendment.
Two objections might be made to this general argument. First, the literal
requirement of universality may seem wooden and extreme: if even one citizen
is omitted from militia service, it would seem to doom the whole enterprise.
But it is hard to believe that anyone could have seriously intended the Second
Amendment to rest on such an implausible background assumption. As I will
consider in the next section, republicans did seem rhetorically to presuppose
literal universality, but in practice they never adopted truly universal militias.
We may then understand the concept of the militia as a regulative ideal or as
a symbol for a political function: republicans sought to give over the control
of arms to a body constituted in such a way that we should have confidence
226. See WRIGHT E AL, supra note 214, at 116-17 & n.9; Wright & Marston, supra note 216, at 99-
103.
227. See Bruce-Briggs, supra note 194, at 39; Wright & Marston, supra note 216, at 94 n.5.
228. See, e.g., Bruce-Briggs, supra note 194, at 41. The "gun culture," see supra note 224, is one that
revolves around hunting. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 214, at 104-06, 112-16.
[Vol. 101: 551
Second Amendment
that it would represent the body of the people, rather than any lesser faction.
Such a body would have to be very broadly representative, potentially open to
everyone, and trained in virtue. Even under these lesser requirements, private
gun owners do not qualify as a militia: they still reflect particular interests1 9
and are still random atoms.Y0
Second, some might argue that if some citizens fail to own arms, they have
only themselves to blame: the vision of the universal militia depends on private
dedication to the state, as reflected in the civic act of firearms possession. But
this response would misconceive the fundamentally political nature of gun
ownership by construing it as an individual right and responsibility. The
argument rests on an implicit analogy to other provisions in the Bill of Rights
designed as protections for the individual against acts of state abuse, such as
the Fourth Amendment. The Second Amendment, in contrast, is a constitutive
or structural provision: it forecasts the relationship between the state and the
people as a whole. Its essential goal is not to preserve liberal rights of individu-
al autonomy, but to ensure that ultimate power remains with the universal
militia. If the militia is less than universal, the harm falls not only on those who
failed to buy guns, but on the republic as a whole, because the means of force
lies in the hands of a special interest. t
Republicans did not intend to leave the universality of the militia to the
chance decision of every citizen to arm herself. The state was supposed to erect
the necessary scaffolding on which the militia could build itself, to muster the
militia and oblige every citizen to own a gun. 2 Some even argued that if
the citizen could not afford a firearm, the state should supply one.233 Even
if every private citizen did buy a gun on her own initiative, moreover, those
purchases would still not generate a militia; without training in virtue and the
experience of public service, citizens would be nothing more than armed but
unbonded atoms.
The identification of the militia with the National Guard is thus too state-
focused, but the identification of the militia with individual gun owners is too
focused on private persons. In the years since the Revolution, state and society
have changed so that constitutional thinking views the government and citizens
as distinct and often adversarial actors. So it may seem natural to case the
Second Amendment as a simple right of liberty-loving private persons to take
229. Levinson is clear about this point: he casts gun owners as a particular group with particular views
in a culture very different from, for example, the legal establishment. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 639-42
(Second Amendment generally ignored by legal establishment).
230. I will consider in the last section the question of what institutions might more closely fill the role
of a universal militia. See infra Part Ifl.D.
231. Similarly, Akhil Amar has argued that the function of the jury was to create popular control over
the administration of justice. The beneficiary of the jury was thus not just the individual defendant but the
whole community; accordingly, in a republican scheme, the defendant may not have the right to waive a
jury trial. See Amar, supra note 103, at 1196-99.
232. See BARLOW, supra note 124, at 16: Cress, supra note 128, at 41.
233. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1804-07 (1791).
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up arms against scheming government ministers. But that description is, in my
view, an oversimplification. The Amendment guaranteed the right of a
state/society, unified in the militia, to resist any threat of corruption, from
private parties or state officials.
C. The Right to Resistance Inside a Militia
1. The Absence of a Constitutional Mandate
The militia is so central to republican thinking that it is surprising that the
proponents of the Amendment did not secure a constitutional mandate for one.
Republicans themselves sensed the lack, believing that the state had an obliga-
tion to constitute a militia. 4 Article I gave Congress considerable power over
the composition of the militia,2 35 and during the debates on its adoption, Anti-
Federalists expressed fear that Congress might use its new power to raise a
select militia and dismantle the state militias.3 6 Before the ratification of the
Bill of Rights, Richard Henry Lee maintained: "[T]he constitution ought to
secure a genuine [militia] and guard against a select militia, by providing that
the militia shall always be kept well organized, armed and disciplined, and
include.., all men capable of bearing arms.''237
But although some of the amendments proposed by the state legislatures
included a prohibition on standing armies-Madison ignored these in drafting
his version-none included a constitutional mandate for a universal militia"3
During Congressional discussion of the Amendment, Elbridge Gerry proposed
that it be revised to mandate a federal duty to assemble a militia, but his motion
failed without a second and without discussion?39 The Second Amendment
thus emerged as a guarantee that all citizens may keep and bear arms, so that
the states would have the material with which to create their militias, and
234. See infra text accompanying notes 237, 239, and note 241.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39. In particular, Congress has the power to organize,
train, and discipline the militia, and to govern that part of the militia in federal service. U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 8, cl. 16. Political leaders assumed that this provision gave Congress the right to summon a select
militia. During the 1790's many federal officials proposed a less than universal militia, and though these
proposals were denounced as unrepublican, no one suggested that they were unconstitutional. See CRESS,
supra note 11, at 116-21.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44, 158-61, and note 158.
237. See LEE, supra note 153, at 169.
238. See Shalhope, supra note 130, at 608-10; Cress, supra note 128, at 29-31. One might not expect
a mandate for a universal state militia in a federal constitution; such a guarantee would more naturally
appear in state constitutions. But the state constitutions do not contain any such mandate. And the federal
Constitution does not require that a federal militia be universal, nor does it ban federal tampering with the
universality of state militias.
239. See I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 107, at 750-51.
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perhaps some limited, not very clear protection for those militias ° -but no
guarantee that there would be a militia." t
Why did the Framers fail to ensure for their posterity what they believed
to be the indispensable institution of a universal militia? From early on, republi-
cans exhibited a rather severe slippage between rhetoric and reality. 2 Many
states did, in a general sense, require that all citizens own arms and serve in
the militia, 3 but they also departed from this ideal in important ways. For
one thing, as the frontier receded, serious military action moved away from the
centers of population, and so states came to rely on expeditionary forces, which
were drawn from volunteers-usually poor-and professional soldiers. The
militia, in contrast, began to rust on the homefront, turning out primarily as an
occasional police force.2" When it did turn out, it did not include all, or only,
citizens. Rich men could purchase exemptions by paying poor men to go in
their places, 5 and even those who were not citizens of the state were subject
to militia duty.246 The states' military forces had come less and less to resem-
ble the military incarnation of the citizenry assembled.
During all of this time, republicans continued to insist that only a universal
militia was appropriate for a true republic-but they did not follow through,
and did not persuade others to follow through, on the commitment. The reason
seems plain: on the one hand, they were not prepared to surrender the universal
militia as a necessary concept, but on the other, they could not persuade
themselves or others to undergo the massive sacrifices involved in universal
service. 7 As a result, they were left in a state of anxiety: they insisted that the
militia must be the whole people, but they knew that in fact it was not.24 They
thus left a dual legacy: to make sense, the Second Amendment requires a
universal militia but does not assure that we will have one.
Over the decades, Americans have come to exploit that discrepancy. As
it became plain that the armato populato would never become a reality, republi-
cans began to express their sad disappointment in a population that shirked its
240. See Cress, supra note 128, at 38; Shalhope, supra note 130, at 610.
241. The Republican writer Centinel complained: "It is remarkable that this article only makes the
observation 'that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, is the best security of a free
state;' it does not ordain, or constitutionally provide for, the establishment of such a one." Centinel, Revived,
INDEPENDENT GAzETTEER, No. XXIX, Sept. 9, 1789, at 2.
242. See CRESS, supra note 11, at 11-14, 65; ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 42-45.
243. See Carp, supra note 113, at 19; Kates, supra note 8, at 215; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 179-82 (1939).
244. See CRESS, supra note 111, at 5-7: Carp, supra note 113, at 19-20.
245. See CRESS, supra note 11l, at 5-6, 59-60.
246. Id. at 6-7.
247. See id. at 80-81, 90-91, 117-18. As one Congressman put it, thoroughly ignoring republican
orthodoxy: "As far as the whole body of the people are necessary to the general defence, they ought to be
armed; but the law ought not to require more than is necessary; for that would be ajust cause of complaint."
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1806 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (1791).
248. Perhaps for this reason, debates over allowing exemptions from militia service on the floor of
Congress tended to be simultaneously interminable and unfocused. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1804-12
(1791).
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civic duty to arm itself.2 49 Today, only a small portion of American citizens
are enrolled in the armed forces, the National Guard, or law enforcement
organizations. Technically, all males aged seventeen to forty-five are members
of the unorganized militia,250 but that status has no practical legal signifi-
cance. Such "militia members" are not required to own guns, to drill together,
or to learn virtue. The statutory provision creating this "universal militia" is
nothing more than a dim memory of a distant hope.
2. The Republican Meaninglessness of the Amendment
From the beginning, then, the republican defense of the Second Amendment
sought to deny reality, because it assumed a universal militia when there was
none. Advocates of the individual rights interpretation of the Amendment thus
have substantial precedent for refusing to recognize that we do not have such
a body. Indeed, these commentators might argue that if we really wanted to
follow the example of early republicans, we would guarantee a right to arms
while willfully ignoring the absence of a universal militia.
There are, however, severe problems with this approach. First, whatever
the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality, republicans still clung to their
insistence that the rhetoric should become reality, by the creation of universal
militias. We no longer even contemplate that possibility. There is no chance
that any modern legislature will impose universal militia service. Second, the
gap between rhetoric and reality has grown drastically over time. In the 1780's,
most citizens owned arms, but today many fewer do.251 This change has two
significant consequences: if there should be a revolution it would be for the
benefit of a smaller portion of the population, and the revolution would be
much less likely to be successful. The absence of a universal militia is now
severe and chronic, and self-deception about its existence has become impossi-
ble.
As a result, for judges trying to interpret the Second Amendment, republi-
canism suggests that the Amendment, as worded, is meaningless. To make any
sense, the Amendment presupposed an institution now gone. Allowing private
parties to own arms would serve no republican purpose, but neither would
denying them arms. For republicans, all we can really do is try to create a
republic again, as I will discuss in Part IV.
249. See Remarks of Rep. Smilie, 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2177, 2191-92 (1808); 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 746-47 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 3d
ed. 1858).
250. See 10 U.S.C. § 311(2) (1989).
251. At most, half of all households in America have guns in them, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
214, at 34-35, 39; Wright & Marston, supra note 216, at 93-94; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 214, at 167 tbl.
2.47. About 29% of Americans personally own a gun, SOURCEBOOK, supra note 214, at 169 tbl. 2.50, and
these owners are demographically skewed, see supra text accompanying notes 214-25.
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D. Alternative Judicial Uses of the Amendment
In this situation, judges might be inclined to use sources other than the
republican tradition to give meaning to the Amendment. This process involves
issues of constitutional interpretation that are beyond the scope of this Article,
but a range of options seems possible. On the one hand, following the strictures
of strict constructionists, some judges might focus only on the literal language.
Unfortunately, if the commentators are any guide, that device will not yield a
clear result.52 Perhaps more importantly, the literal language, standing alone,
is an exceedingly narrow basis for interpretation. Even the most strict construc-
tionists would look to the original understanding in addition to the lan-
guage 3-but again, that intent can have no meaning today. Faced with these
difficulties, one might conclude that the Amendment is literally outdated, made
irrelevant by events, and therefore should have no meaning at all-as if the
Constitution required Congress to keep a Carolina Parrot, now extinct, as a
mascot. Courts would then read the provision as a dead letter.
It is possible, however, for courts to update the Amendment in a variety
of ways. This course might be the best one since the Amendment does exist
and does serve a function in the scheme set up by the Constitution. One style
of updating would read the Amendment, as applied to the states through the
Due Process Clause, in the way that Justice Harlan read the Due Process
Clause: whatever its original meaning, the Amendment has become a part of
the living tradition of the American people, part of our scheme of ordered
liberty 514 In that process, the provision has taken on a new meaning, as a
liberal right to arms to secure individual autonomy against private assailants
252. On the one hand, the provision includes a purpose clause-enshrining a "well regulated mili-
tia"--so that courts might limit the right to arms to militia members. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 644;
sources cited supra note 29. To take that course, however, we would need to know who the militia is.
Absent a "plain meaning" from the face of the provision, we would normally consult its intellectual
context-but that is how we got into this mess in the first place. On the other hand, the purpose clause might
not be exclusive. So, based only on its language, the provision might ensure the right of arms for many
purposes. See Hardy, supra note 29, at 623, 627-28; Kates, supra note 8, at 217 n.53. And the provision
does guarantee the right of "the people" to "keep and bear Arms," so perhaps courts could read the
provision to'guarantee an individual right to arms. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 84-85; Hardy, supra
note 29, at 629-30; Kates, supra note 8, at 218; Lund, supra note 16, at 107. That course, too, seems
troubling: the purpose clause could as easily be exclusive as nonexclusive (the Second Amendment is
unusual in the Bill of Rights for having such a clause, so it seems important). Levinson, too, concludes that
the literal language is obscure and then goes on to look at the republican tradition. See Levinson, supra note
2, at 643-45. Other commentators argue that the language supports one view or another, but then use
historical materials to amplify their position, suggesting that the language may not be clear enough to rely
on alone. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 8, at 220.
253. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.L
1, 8 (1971). In the context of free speech, for instance, Judge Bork has acknowledged that text and intent
together may be unclear, so that we must sometimes construct a theory of the Constitution based on
principles implicit in the text and intent. See id. at 22-23. Some writers have, however, suggested that one
can derive a meaning from the text of the Second Amendment alone. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at
84-87; Hardy, supra note 29, at 622-23.
254. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
or even the government. Whatever one thinks about that vision, it is deeply
embedded in large parts of the American psyche.15
Courts could, however, seek to update the Amendment in a more republican
fashion, and that course has the dual advantage of being more true to the
original context and, for some, more appealing because it is more republican.
One way to do such updating would be for courts to order the kinds of reforms
that I consider in the next part, reforms that would serve the same function as
the old militia-a reconstituted militia, universal service, workplace democracy,
and the like. But even if those reforms might be appropriate as legislation,
judicial enforcement suffers from familiar problems. For one thing, courts are
not the best institutions for supervising such massive and complicated social
change.5 6 For another, even if a court viewed originalist theories dimly, it
would face great obstacles in mandating workplace democracy or even a
universal militia on the basis of a provision that on its face does no more than
guarantee a right to arms. Such an order might prove unenforceable, as the
public would likely resist it tooth and nail as illegitimate. Such a situation is
not an auspicious beginning for a plan designed to create a virtuous, public-
regarding populace.
There are, on the other hand, judicially manageable ways for courts to
update the Amendment. The right to arms and the universal militia were
significant structural elements in the polity contemplated by the Constitution
and its amendments, read as a whole. With their demise, there is a hole in the
fabric of the document where they used to be. To mend that hole, courts might
stretch the other fibers of the constitutional fabric to cover it, by reading other
parts of the Constitution in such a way as to serve militia-like functions. An
updated Second Amendment would thus have no independent content but would
be a shadowy gravitational presence in interpreting the rest of the Constitution.
In particular, after the demise of the Amendment, the people as a body no
longer have the ability to resist government outside the normal channels. So
new interpretations should seek to increase the influence of the people over
their government2s7
255. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
256. The logistical difficulties would be much greater than cases in which courts have declined to take
over existing institutions. See, e.g., Boston Pub. Hous. Tenants' Policy Council v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 493
(D. Mass. 1974). To take the example of the militia alone: a court would have to order revenue raised, units
organized and trained, and regulations promulgated. And think of the logical test to determine whether the
legislature has met the order: has the populace become virtuous? If ever there was a nonjusticiable standard,
this is it.
257. I have in mind a form of constitutional interpretation similar to that proposed by Charles Black,
as an "exegesis [not] of the particular textual passage considered as a directive of action ... [but] the
method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in
some principal part." CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
7 (1969). Considered as a textual directive, the Second Amendment only guarantees a right to arms; but
it also is part of a relationship between government and citizens in which the latter hold power outside the
normal channels. A liberal critic might respond that the Amendment really is an isolated excrescence in
a liberal text, not a part of a deep structural relationship. In this view, the provision's death or transformation
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Several examples may illustrate this idea. First, courts could use the
gravitational pull of the Second Amendment to create constitutional space for
legislation that might otherwise be suspect. Several of the neorepublican
proposals that I consider in the next part-such as campaign finance reform
or proportional representationl 6-- might violate current law. Courts might
conclude that these reforms are designed to serve some of the functions of the
Second Amendment, and since the courts cannot enforce the Amendment, they
should allow these reforms instead.
Second, courts might read the constitutional protections of property in new
ways.s 9 Like the right to arms, the republican function of property rights was
to ensure independent, virtuous citizens. Also like the right to arms, republican
attitudes toward property rights contained a tension: on the one hand, the state
should not tinker with them, so as to allow real independence; but on the other,
the distribution of property needed to be universal, so that some citizens would
not dominate others."0 If free exchange did not produce universal ownership
of property, the state had to decide whether to redistribute.2 61 In the case of
the right to arms, the state had made that decision: it required universal mem-
bership in the militia. But in the case of property, republicans sought to avoid
the conclusion that the state had a proper role in universalizing property.
Instead, they hoped that the market, accompanied by geographical expansion,
would take care of the matter by producing relative equality.
262
To persist in such a belief today is self-deluding. Those with property
dominate politics in a way that the republicans would find appalling,263 and,
with the practical demise of arms as a check on government, the equal distribu-
tion of property has become especially important. In particular, republicans may
have been uncomfortable with a state role to ensure universal property owner-
ship, but they were not at all uncomfortable with a state role to ensure universal
into a private right only brings it into line with the liberal underpinnings of the rest of the text. In fact,
however, the Constitution considered in "all its parts" is a combination of republican and liberal elements,
with the Bill of Rights a careful republican hedge against the liberalism of the body of the document. See
supra text accompanying notes 103-06; Amar, supra note 103; James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The
Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 341-44
(1990).
258. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1576-77; infra text accompanying notes 318-20.
259. As James Pope has argued, the Supreme Court might also read the First Amendment's right of
assembly in a republican light, consistent with its heritage. See Pope, supra note 257, at 325-45. In
particular, the Court might protect boycotts as a form of direct popular participation in government. See
id. at 347-56.
260. See Frank L Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72
IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1327-35 (1987): supra note 71.
261. See Alexander, supra note 71, at 300-02.
262. See id. at 301; Michelman, supra note 260, at 1333-34. The reason for the different attitudes
toward the two rights may be that in the case of property, ensuring universality seemed necessarily to
involve invading the property rights of some to give property to others. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMIrs OF AMERICAN CONSTtTIOTIONALISM 205-07 (1990). In the case of arms,
republicans seemed to sense no such tension: everyone could and should own a gun, and the more who did,
the better for all. Thus, arms ownership seems a better symbol for republicanism than property rights.
263. See NEDELSKY, supra note 262, at 216-22.
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ownership of the means of force. With that latter role gone, however, the state
function of ensuring universal popular control of the government is more
constricted than contemplated by the Bill of Rights. One natural path of reex-
pansion is for the state to have a larger role in ensuring universal property
possession.
Thus, courts could reconceive property rights as the necessary basis for
political participation, not simply as protection for private expectations.2
That reconception would, inter alia, involve less protection against the redistri-
bution of traditional property rights, 5 which have led to the present inequali-
ty of power,2 6 and more protection for newer forms of property. As Nedelsky
has elaborated, traditional "property no longer provides people with the basis
for independence and autonomy in the eighteenth century sense." 26 Two
centuries ago, a farmer's land or a craftsman's tools may have provided some
"real independence," but the salaried employees, welfare recipients, and share-
holders of today are dependent on a web of relationships.268 Courts might
therefore place less emphasis on traditional property and more on statutory
welfare and other kinds of property that provide autonomy in the modern
world.2 69 The "new property" 270 cannot provide complete independence,
because it originates in an act of the legislature, is distributed through the
bureaucracy, and depends on the courts for its continuing protection. But
traditional property, too, has depended on state support.272 And complete
independence was never part of the paradoxical republican ideal: we must have
rights in order to direct the state, but we cannot have rights without state
protection.2 3
264. See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1102-03, 1109-14 (1981).
265. Others have argued that the historical roots of the Takings Clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. V, are
liberal, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985), and if they are right, then the Second and Fifth
Amendments are in tension, growing out of different traditions. But under the argument that I advance here,
judges should import some of the Second Amendment's republican meaning into the liberal Takings Clause.
We might then arrive at a "hybrid" Fifth Amendment that seeks somehow to secure property as both a
collection of legitimate expectations and a source of political power.
266. See Michelman, supra note 264, at 1112-13. It would also lead to greater acceptance of legislative
efforts to curtail the ability of the rich to dominate the speech marketplace. See infra notes 318-20 and
accompanying text. Michelman, supra note 260, at 1343-45.
267. Nedelsky, supra note 66, at 19.
268. See id. at 19-20.
269. See id. at 26-28.
270. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
271. Akhil Amar has argued, however, that the 13th Amendment, with its republican underpinnings,
may impose on the legislature a duty (not judicially enforceable) to provide each citizen with the modern
equivalent of 40 acres and a mule-enough property to make independent political activity possible. See
Akhil R. Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990).
272. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11-14 (1927); Nedelsky,
supra note 66, at 18-19.
273. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. Michelman notes this generative tension.
Michelman, supra note 260, at 1334; Michelman, supra note 264, at 1110. Nedelsky, too, notes the tension
in the nature of property rights, see NEDELSKY, supra note 262, at 207-08, 272-74, but she has recently
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Third, the disappearance of the militia should create a heightened constitu-
tional suspicion of the standing army and the police. Those bodies have, in a
sense, usurped the militia's control of the means of force, and they have
systematic interests in making their hold more effective at the expense of the
liberties of the people. Unless we revive the militia, the republican nightmare
may be inevitable, as the populace stands effectively disarmed before the might
of the state. But courts can at least try to restrict that tendency by applying the
Constitution stringently against the military and police.2 7
This suspicion should be at its height when the standing army and the
police come into contact with the general populace and seek to restrict citizens'
control over their own lives. 75 For example, the Supreme Court should not
have deferred to the military's claims of necessity in the Japanese-American
internment cases.276 Similarly, criminal procedure cases that expand the dis-
cretion of the police at the expense of individual liberties represent a troubling
direction for the Court.277 On the other hand, resolving such cases from a
rejected constitutional property as a means to reempower the people. The Madisonian tradition of protection
of private property from the contract of the majority, she thinks, is too deeply entrenched in American
culture. In Nedelsky's view, Madison sought to remove the people from power precisely because they might
adjust the rules of the market, so that property would be more equally distributed among them. See id. at
203-05, 207-211. Inequality is therefore a deep and integral part of the American tradition of property, and
an egalitarian redefinition of property is likely to fail for that reason. See id. at 246, 261,275-76. Nedelsky
prefers to move away from property as a central concept, see id. at 265, to achieve ends that are recogniz-
ably republican, see id. at 265-76. Perhaps she is right that property rights are not the most promising route
for empowerment, but they could be one useful route among many. At one point, NedeIsky argues that
property rights could be positively pernicious, because the old tradition of inequality is so strong in the
minds of Americans that any revival would likely be regressive. See id. at 246. But if the tradition of
venerating property rights really is that strong, then it would seem that the idea of property will always be
with us, and abandoning property altogether should be no easier than redefining it.
274. Elaine Scarry has gone so far as to suggest that the Supreme Court should read the Second
Amendment as prohibiting nuclear war. One of the purposes of the right to arms was to give the populace
direct control over the decision whether to go to war:. if the government declared war and called up its armed
citizenry, but no one came, no war could occur. Nuclear war, however, needs no popular ratification, as
war can begin almost with a politician's push of a button. See Scarry, supra note 150, at 1297-1301, 1309-
16.
275. The judiciary's deference to police and military discretion over their internal matters presents a
slightly different set of concerns. The principal republican fear of a standing army was the army's tendency
to dominate politics and wrest freedom from the public. But discipline within the army had a degrading
effect on the citizens themselves. Many republicans were concerned that soldierhood and citizenship fostered
inconsistent values as the one insisted on slavish obedience and the other fostered independent judgment.
If we were to have a standing army, it should be as close to an army of citizen-soldiers as possible. See
ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 38-40. Thus, the marked deference to military judgment in Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting claim that Free Exercise Clause gave Orthodox Jewish officer
the right to wear a yarmulke while on duty), was inappropriate because of the military rule's effect on
Goldman himself; in effect, it sought to deny him the status of an independent citizen. See Michelman, supra
note 1, at 12-17; cf. Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as
O)ymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 25, 42 (1989) (explaining that militarism normalizes oppression of
women).
276. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943).
277. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990) (holding that warrantless entry into home
is constitutional upon permission from third party who police reasonably believed had joint authority over
premises but who did not have such authority), Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990) (allowing
warrantless seizure of"plain view" evidence even if discovery of evidence was not inadvertent); Maryland
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republican perspective is not easy, because the police are viewed as seeking
to control "rebels"--i.e., criminals seeking to disrupt the common good-and
as deserving whatever discretion they need and are unlikely to abuse. For
republicans, it may be better for some more truly popular body, like the militia,
to control crime, but that is not currently an option. So in this imperfect world,
the Court must walk a tightrope: it must allow the police, whom it cannot trust,
to control crime, which detracts from the common good, but without allowing
them to intimidate law-abiding citizens, which also detracts from the common
good. One thing that the Court should not do, however, is what it seems to be
doing: basing constitutional decisions on apparent confidence that the police
generally act in good faith."
IV. REPUBLICAN REFORM
A. Advisability
None of the interpretations of the Amendment proposed in the last part can
secure all of the ends that republicans hoped that it would. Judicial strategies
can ultimately offer only limited change; moreover, in republican terms, the
courts are not the best forum in which to seek popular control. In this section,
I will consider whether it is desirable for modern republicans to seek a contem-
porary surrogate for the militia outside of the courts. Any adequate substitute
must serve several functions. First, the militia reflected and induced virtue. It
was universal, so as to reflect the common good; and it offered training in
virtue, making citizens independent and self-sacrificing. Second, the militia
increased citizen control over the government. It allowed citizens to participate
directly in their own self-government, not just through the process of represen-
tation, and it consigned to them ultimate control of the means of force. The two
functions served by the militia were intimately linked; republicans wanted to
consign force to virtue.
1. Virtue Functions
In the twentieth century, the first function-the militia's connection with
the common good-has become more problematic, because of the diversity and
v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (holding that while executing arrest warrant, police officers may execute
warrantless protective sweep of entire house on reasonable suspicion of danger); Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79 (1987) (holding that honest factual mistakes about premises, in drawing up or executing warrant,
will not invalidate warrant or search); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (holding that evidence
obtained during inventory search of impounded automobile may be used as basis of prosecution); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (providing "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule).
278. See Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800; Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309-2310; Buie, 110 S.Ct. at 1098;
Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87-88; Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374-76; Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of
Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1291-97, 1303, 1311, 1316-
27 (1990).
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expansion of the citizenry. Historically, some republicans expressed a desire
for a homogeneous population, so that every citizen would have the same
good.279 When republicans occasionally acknowledged the fact of diversity, they
offered a number of responses. Some argued teleologically that despite superfi-
cial diversity, humans shared the same essential nature-a civic personali-
ty-and should be encouraged to realize that nature. As a result, in the end, the
population was ultimately homogeneous with regard to everything that mat-
tered.280 Other republicans argued that citizens were naturally divided into
three estates; the challenge of political theory was to cause each to serve the
common good in its own way, with its own virtues.8'
But how do we define the common good today, when most are not pre-
pared to believe in a homogeneous citizenry, ascribed teloi, or natural estates,
when each individual has a right to be different, and when voices from the
margin are praised, not denigrated? 212 Neorepublicans have tried to retain the
universalism of the republican tradition while not disparaging modern diversity.
They have proposed an inclusive republicanism, based on persuasive dialogue
between citizens. Individuals enter this dialogue with different ends, but through
conversation, they shift their self-understandings, reaching for the perspectives
of others, and drawing upon a shared past of normatively authoritative recollec-
tions.32 The hope is not for a unitary common good, but for a participatory
process such that "everyone subject to a law-like utterance can actually agree
that the utterance warrants being promulgated as law."'
If a militia-surrogate must serve this new ideal, it is more difficult to design
its structure. Under the old vision of the commonweal, the task was merely to
ensure that the means of power resided with the body of the people, who shared
one good. Private armies might rebel against the public good, but the militia,
as the rest of society, would suppress the rebellion. The situation is quite
different if all of society is like the rebels, each segment with a separate
interest, richly diverse and dissentient. The neorepublicans' answer is that the
citizenry must be transformed through dialogic persuasion, to recognize their
sameness in their difference. But that prescription is a much taller order even
than giving the means of force to citizens.
It is not, however, much greater than what the older republicans, at their
most optimistic, hoped of the militia. They too believed that service in the
militia could transform citizens by molding them into a public-spirited, organic
279. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89, note 159.
280. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 22.
281. See POCOCK, supra note 44, at 68-80; supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
282. See Michelman, supra note 66.
283. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Toward a ModernPostmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 291, 360-68 (1985); Michelman, supra note 1, at 31-33; Michelman, supra note 66, at 1526-28;
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1566-71.
284. Michelman, supra note 66, at 1527.
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body."5 A modern version of the militia might induce the modern version
of this civic transformation: it might bring citizens together into self-revisory
dialogue. The exact nature of the transformation is different, but the essential
function of the militia is similar.
The primary difference between the two visions of civic transformation is
that the nature of the proposed modem transformation is much more vague than
the older version. The old militia was supposed to make citizens civic-minded
and critical, and both of these qualities seem familiar to us today. In contrast,
dialogic self-revision is a relatively new idea. Its parameters are not yet clear,
and neorepublicans tend to talk about it in tentative or general terms.286 More-
over, because it is a reformative ideal, it has no real world referents. No one
can point to an example of the kind of dialogue that he would like to see,
because none yet exists. As a result, conceptualizing modern analogues to the
militia is difficult in part because the function that it is supposed to serve is
not yet in sharp focus. This problem-of vagueness and incompletion-may
be a part of all neorepublicanism and even of all new intellectual movements.
As I will discuss below, however, the militia ideal makes the problem especial-
ly acute. The still-vague self-revisory dialogue is supposed to reform the people
so that it would be wise to commit to them possession of the ultimate means
of force.
The expansion of the citizenry creates another problem besides the simple
fact of diversity: the citizenry now includes members without, perhaps, the
requisite material conditions for full participation. In the 1780's, only male
property-holders-in some states only white male property-holders-could be
citizens and thereby militia members. 7 Today, the citizenry is vastly larger,
and hence the militia would be as well. Abandoning the racial and gender based
exclusivity of the militia creates no republican difficulty, because no part of
republicanism affirmatively requires race or gender bias. Eliminating the
property qualification, however, is not so easy. According to republican theory,
only those with property can have the independent judgment necessary to be
good citizens,288 but not all citizens today have the requisite economic inde-
pendence.219 A republican politics may therefore not be possible with the
present citizenry.
Again, however, it is premature to despair of remedying the situation.
Property qualifications on the franchise served the same end as bearing arms:
ensuring that citizens had the requisite power independently to follow the
common good. As long as citizens are subject to economic tyranny by private
285. See supra text accompanying notes 162-70.
286. Michelman, for example, acknowledges: "[Glaining a secure grasp on such a possibility stretches
to the limits our powers of comprehension .... Michelman, supra note 66, at 1527.
287. See. e.g.. WOOD, supra note 56, at 168-69.
288. See supra note 71, text accompanying notes 259-62; EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY/
AMERIcAN FREEDOM 381-87 (1975).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 263-73.
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actors or governmental tyranny by public ones, they cannot be virtuous. The
virtue functions of the militia thus depend on the power functions of the militia:
a citizenry can be virtuous only if also powerful. By the same token, even a
dramatically expanded citizenry could be virtuous if it were possible to find
ways to empower them through militia290 or propertY291 surrogates.
2. Power Functions
The militia ideal sought to increase the direct control of the virtuous
populace over their government, outside the normal channels of representation.
In its most restrictive version, the militia's right of resistance was defensive and
occasional: when tyrants abused their power, the people could remove them
from office and select new rulers. But by the 1780's, the concept of the militia
had become part of an ideal of constant citizen involvement in government.
Anti-Federalists sought to protect local militias so that the militias could protect
local legislatures, because those legislatures were more democratic than Con-
gress. Service in the militia was thought to transform members into active
citizens, committed to the public good but suspicious of government, confident
in their right to disagree. As a result, citizens' conduct at the polls would reflect
not fear or deference, but independent assessment of the commonweal. Militia
service itself, moreover, was a form of political participation, because the
militia always had to appraise the decisions of the government. If those deci-
sions departed from the commonweal, militia members should first refuse to
enforce them, then resist them, and eventually either oust the persons in office
or reform the government.292
This function may be the most terrifying aspect of the militia. Many might
find it better to regularize power by surrendering it to "responsible" decision-
makers. That fear is not irrational, even in republican terms, for we are caught
in the problem of origins, of how to get a republic off the ground. In republican
theory, only a virtuous citizen militia can be entrusted with the means of force
to resist state authority, but citizens will not be virtuous until they are already
participating in policymaking under a republican form of government. The
problem of origins is different from that of maintaining an ongoing republic,
and the appropriate approach to the two problems may be very different. If we
were already in a republic, there would be little excuse for failing to entrust
the means of force into the people's hands. No course is without peril; in a
republic, giving arms to the people is safer than giving arms to the government.
In nonrepublican politics, however, it is right to fear even the body of the
people because they may not be virtuous. We might seek to change that
situation, and opportunities for the exercise of virtue may always involve some
290. For possibilities, see infra Part IV.B.
291. For possibilities, see supra text accompanying notes 264-73 (discussion of "new property").
292. See supra Part II.B.5.
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risk. There is, however, no reason to court disaster by rapid, wholesale change.
It is not surprising that much neorepublicanism is incremental in its reform
program. We may ultimately make dramatic changes, but more limited popular
control may be appropriate for a less republican populace.
3. The Militia Ideal and Neorepublicanism
Thus broken into its constitutive functions, the militia ideal is thoroughly
consistent with the rest of republicanism: it seeks to ensure that citizens pursue
more than their own self-interest, and it seeks to return power to the citizenry.
The ideal stresses three particular elements of republicanism. First, it is popu-
list: control of force should belong not to army officers, bureaucrats, or judges
but to the people. Second, it has some connection to decentralization.293 Third,
it takes seriously the impact on the political arena of the distribution of power.
This collection of ideals should not be embarrassing to progressive republi-
cans.294 Indeed, only the last is at all troubling from a progressive perspective.
In Professor Brown's words, the right to arms contemplates the people "subdu-
ing with force what [they] cannot discursively persuade."295 She is right.
Republicans recognized that sometimes reason does not work, sometimes people
do evil things, and sometimes the only course is to resist with force. That view,
however, does not suggest that violence should be a normal part of political
life; to the contrary, for republicans, revolution was a course of last resort.
Indeed, they hoped that popular arms possession would forestall the need for
resistance, since demagogues or tyrants would yield in advance. Finally, since
we are not in a republic, the militia ideal suggests only that we move toward
293. In part, this connection is only a restatement of the first feature: the Second Amendment protected
state militias because they were closer to the people. Today, the connection between the two is more
complicated. The advantages of localism are still real, but decentralization also risks some reduction in
universality, since localities are often demographically skewed compared to the nation as a whole. Two
centuries ago, this skewing may have been less significant, because the relevant point of comparison was
the state community, the location of most important decisions. With the rise of a national culture and a
national government, too much decentralization could create a kind of geographically defined, select militia.
The goal should therefore be to decentralize power, but to broadly inclusive bodies. For suggestions on how
to do so, see BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984); Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1606-08 (1988).
294. In a recent article, James Gray Pope emphasizes the populist strain of republican politics. He
argues that the Constitution presupposes that in normal times, politics-as-usual consists of deals between
interest groups. But in "republican moments," the people should be able to take a direct hand in their
government, outside of the normal channels, to engage in serious discussion of the common good. See Pope,
supra note 257, at 310-12.
Pope's vision of republican politics shares the militia ideal's dedication to popular empowerment, but
differs in imagining that republican politics can occur only in "moments." Indeed, Pope suggests that even
if the Second Amendment protects a right of resistance, that right "does not provide an adequate home for
popular republican politics" because the people could take up arms only under the rarest of circumstances.
See id. at 328. But as I have argued, the purported benefits of universal arms possession extended to politics-
as-usual, not just moments of crisis: the people would never accept a passive role in government, and
government would rarely become corrupt, because both knew that the people could revolt. See supra Parts
II.B.5, IV.A.2.
295. Brown, supra note 6, at 664.
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some kind of popular reempowerment, not that we issue guns to potential
murderers and rapists. This stance seems both realistic and hopeful.2 6 Neore-
publicans should celebrate the Second Amendment, not be embarrassed by it.
Have I missed something essential about the militia by reducing it to virtue
and power, rather than by talking about martiality and gender? Perhaps. Repub-
licans' use of metaphors of masculinity to describe militia members, and the
centrality of guns, danger, physicality, and male-bonding themes in recollections
of militia service suggest that, for many, the militia may have offered rich
emotional rewards for the same reasons that hunting trips and team sports
do.2 97 No doubt, many republicans became attached to the militia more from
these personal experiences than from any theoretical commitment. Nevertheless,
the republicans did not make these experiences a part of their conscious analy-
sis of the Second Amendment. They were, in a sense, the accidents rather than
the essence of the militia in republican thought.29 In any event, we can take
what we like from the militia ideal and reject the rest. But just as we should
not accept the "macho" aspects of the militia just because they cover an
admirable core, so we should not reject the core because it comes wrapped in
"macho" packaging.
B. Reform Possibilities
I discuss below several structures that might serve as militia-surrogates
under modern conditions. Because of space constraints, this discussion of far-
reaching, controversial reforms is necessarily sketchy and suggestive. In
particular, I analyze only how well these structures might realize the old militia
functions; I do not purport to consider their overall wisdom. But to the extent
the militia is a worthy icon, good militia surrogates should command our
attention as well.
1. A Universal Militia
The most obvious way to secure the functions served by the old militia
would be to reconstitute a universal militia along republican lines. Conditions
296. Indeed, I can imagine only one group of neorepublicans who would resist this aspect of the militia
ideal: those who would disarm everyone-citizenry, police, and military. But that option only pushes the
analysis back a step: if we eliminate guns, the state will presumably still employ some method of force to
keep order-tear gas or nightsticks or muscle-and we must still decide whether we can more safely vest
the population with greater control over that use of force.
297. See, e.g., ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 4-5, 10-13. Jean Bethke Elshtain, for example, has argued
that the tradition of armed civic virtue has all too often drawn the populace together in a nationalist dream
of military glory rather than in service to fellow citizens. See Jean B. Elshtain, Citizenship and Armed Civic
Virtue: Some Critical Questions on the Commitment to Public Life, in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA 47, 50-55
(Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V. Norman eds., 1988).
298. See Scarry, supra note 150, at 1289-90 n.100 ("[Tihough the vocabulary can easily be read as
gendered, it would in the long run be an error to read the idiom narrowly since the language.., belongs
to 'resistance' whether ... male or female.").
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have so changed, however, that the new militia could not generate all of the
benefits of the old-although it might produce some. Significantly, this new
body would have to coexist, for security reasons, with a professional army. The
technology of war is so advanced that exclusive reliance on an amateur force
is not an option. Even many colonial republicans assumed that a small standing
army could be consistent with liberty if the militia were sufficiently vigor-
ous.299 Modem military technology, however, would make even a vigorous
militia less of a threat to an oppressive government than in the eighteenth
century."° To make the right of resistance a real one, we would have to
guarantee a private right to possess launchers and attack helicopters.
The clear objection to creating such a right builds on Brown's: it may be
dangerous to give small arms to unvirtuous citizens; it seems suicidal to give
them weapons of mass destruction. How then do we assure that the militia is
virtuous? It would have to be universal, so that all of the interests of the people
would be represented. But republicans assumed that the people would be a
homogeneous group with a single set of interests, perceptions, and desires. In
contrast, a modern militia would be a reflection of modern America-divided
and driven by self-interest. Without some change in society, the effect of
mandatory militia service is only too easy to predict. Citizens would experience
service as one more demand by a distant and alienating bureaucracy, and those
alienated citizens would be in possession of very dangerous weapons.
As noted before, one proposed neorepublican method of instilling virtue
is citizen participation in self-revisory political dialogue. A revived militia
seems to be a promising forum for such dialogue. Part of the folklore of
America depicts the army as a melting pot in which young men from different
backgrounds come to know and understand each other."1 Military history
suggests that the primary source of combat bravery is intense commitment to
fellow soldiers 3l---a good basis for discussion and self-revision. Potentially,
something of the same sort might occur in a militia. The main business of a
militia is certainly not political discussion, but war and police activity. Never-
299. See CRESS, supra note 11, at 278-93.
300. Professor Levinson argues that even rifles in private hands can exercise a check against a modern
army, because they will change government's calculus in deciding whether and how to oppress the populace.
See Levinson, supra note 2, at 648-50. This checking function is a substantial advantage, but it still falls
short of republican hopes that the body of the people would have the power not just to check government
but to overthrow it when circumstances warranted.
301. This bit of folklore is a recurrent theme in novels and movies. For examples, see PHILIP CAPUTO,
A RUMOR OF WAR (1977); SUSAN F. SCHAEFER, BUFFALO AFTERNOON (1989); and Neil Simon's film
BILOXI BLUES (Universal 1988). Kenneth Karst notes the same phenomenon. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit
of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 501 (1991). Karst argues
that the military's present exclusionary policies involve the symbolic removal of women, gays, and lesbians
from power, and thereby deny them equal citizenship, see id. at 500, a view with which republicans would
agree.
302. See, e.g., GERALD F. LINDERMAN, EMBATTLED COURAGE 234-36 (1987). At this time, American
combat officers are appearing every night on the evening news to explain that, in the heat of battle, soldiers
do not fight for Mom and Apple Pie: "They fight for their buddies." REID MITCHELL, CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS
17-18 (1988).
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theless, linking the use of arms in public service to political dialogue might
remind citizens that they ultimately control the state.
A revived militia is therefore an attractive option only if it can provide an
opportunity for dialogic self-government. To do so, the militia must have
something to talk about, which raises the troubling question of its relationship
to the civil government. During normal times, a republican militia is an arm
of the state and takes its orders from elected representatives. At the same time,
such a militia must exercise independent judgment in reviewing those orders:
it might decline to support a tyrant, take up arms to overthrow the government,
or put down civil insurrection on its own initiative. In such cases, the militia
would offer great scope for dialogue; members would decide how to use the
means of force for the commonweal after careful, self-revisory discussion.
That course might make many readers uneasy. The idea of a militia setting
policy and enforcing it with force is terrifying. Modern citizens might feel much
more comfortable with a militia trained never to question its orders from a civil
government. That fear suggests how far we have come from the eighteenth-
century world, but it is not an irrational fear, even within republican terms.
Republican governments are not suitable for all peoples at all times, and we
are not now the stuff of which republics are made. That does not mean, howev-
er, that we are paralyzed. It does mean that we must ask how we can best
inculcate the values and develop the institutions essential to the vitality of a
healthy republic.
A truly independent militia should be a late republican reform, if indeed
conditions ever warrant one. Much of neorepublican reform is deliberately
incremental. An independent militia would be a drastic and very high risk
change. If other reforms first create a virtuous citizenry, it may then be time
to consider a freestanding militia. In the interim, the most advisable alternative
is having a militia under orders from the civil government but vested with
ministerial discretion over daily operations. Such a highly "tamed" militia
would closely resemble universal civic service, which I consider in the next
section.
An obedient militia still leaves control over the means of force in the hands
of government, and, to that extent, it falls short of the function served by the
old militia. But since we do not currently have a republic, we must choose
among options, none of which match the ideal. The question is thus whether
it is more advisable to trust the government or the people with direct control
of the means of force. The argument for trusting the government is largely
prudential. Government abuses its control of the means of force, but we live
with those abuses daily. In contrast, we do not know how great the abuses of
an independent but unvirtuous militia might be, but they are potentially much
greater. The government is subject to influence by public opinion and electoral
control. To be sure, republican theory recognizes that such attenuated controls
may be insufficient to resist tyranny; hence, the belief in a popular right of
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
revolution. Nevertheless, such controls are not negligible and form a valuable
check on government misconduct. If at some future point citizens habitually
engage in self-modulating political discourse, we may come to trust them more
than we trust the government with the means of force. Presently, however, it
seems wise at first to move incrementally. Moreover, the overall purpose of
the militia was to give the people the ability to control their own destiny.
Vesting them with the control of force is the ultimate means to this end, but
there are less extreme steps to empower the people short of giving them guns.
The militia ideal thus highlights what may be the besetting vice of neore-
publicanism: its utopian, somewhat out-of-focus quality. It starkly suggests how
far, if we take the intellectual inheritance seriously, we must go: reforming the
character of the people so thoroughly that they should have guns so as to be
able to overthrow the government. To many, even those sympathetic to neore-
publicanism, that ideal may seem very utopian under present conditions. To
respond that reformation will occur through self-revisory dialogue may not offer
much solace given how relatively vague and incomplete that idea still is. And
the intermediate steps on the way-some of which I discuss below-are really
a number of separate ideas which may or may not, taken together, work a
revolution in the character of the citizenry. The militia ideal thus suggests that
we approach neorepublicanism carefully, not because it is violent or sexist, but
because it is so hopeful.
Utopianism, however, may be the besetting sin of any new collection of
ideas that seeks to change deep trends in modern social development. It may
be appropriate to repeat the obvious: without some utopianism, abolitionists,
women suffragists, and civil rights leaders would never have been able to get
out of bed in the morning. If we do not try, we will never know.
2. Universal Service
Another alternative, currently much discussed, 0 3 is universal public ser-
vice, not necessarily military, for a term of years in youth. The promised
benefits of this course mirror some of those anticipated for the old militia.
Service would bring together people from different classes, occupations, and
ways of life into a common experience that could offer a basis for dialogue
allowing self-revision through empathy with others.3°4 And service to others
and the state, such as feeding the elderly, working in disadvantaged areas, or
303. See WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., GRATITUDE (1990); CHARLES MOSKOS, A CALLTO CIVIC SERVICE
(1988); NATIONAL SERVICE (Williamson M. Evers ed., 1990).
304. AMITAI ETZIONI, AN IMMODEST AGENDA: REBUILDING AMERICA BEFORE THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 160 (1983); BUCKLEY, supra note 303, at 28-30.
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rebuilding our infrastructure, might promote self-sacrifice, reduce self-absorp-
tion, and provide exposure to different folks and ways. 05
Service plais are not without their problems, the most significant being the
specter of totalitarianism if service is mandatory. None of the programs current-
ly proposed by Congress or the Administration require service. Instead, they
offer incentives like college aid, salaried jobs, or tax benefits. 3 6 But such
financial incentive mechanisms might greatly reduce class-mixing in service,
since primarily the less affluent would join.307 A coercive service program,
however, has great problems as well, and not just for liberals or libertarians.
We are close to the center of the republican paradox. On the one hand, republi-
cans endorse mandatory service. Without state supervision the militia could not
be either universal or trained to virtue. On the other hand, one should be
suspicious of the state as well, because state supervision could easily become
indoctrination under a corrupt apparatus.308 The ideal would be to use the
state mechanism to convene the people into dialogue, but the people's judgment
would then become independent of the state. At its best, universal service might
capture this balance, offering opportunity for civic education from fellow
citizens, not from state exhortation.309
As some visible politicians310 and pundits" now support various ser-
vice plans, we may have a chance to evaluate this option. With luck, it might
provide militia-like training in virtue, and so it is probably a necessary compo-
305. Amitai Etzioni, Comments, in NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note 303, at 154; Tim W. Ferguson,
Comments, in NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note 303, at 72-73; Don Wycliff, Discussion, in NATIONAL
SERVICE, supra note 303, at 260; MOSKOS, supra note 303, at 4-6; BUCKLEY, supra note 303, at 8.
306. See NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note 303, at xix-xx.
307. See Benjamin R. Barber, Discussion, in NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note 303, at 80.
308. Some modern opponents of universal service stress this danger. See JOHN W. CHAMBERS,
DRAFTEES OR VOLUNTEERS 561 (1975); Virginia Postrel, Comments, in NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note
303, at 217; BUCKLEY, supra note 303, at 48-49. The concern has an analogue in republican tensions over
a wartime draft during the Revolution: Americans had a duty to fight for their country (part of virtue was
self-sacrifice), but making them do so seemed inconsistent with their status as free citizens (another part
of virtue was independence). See ROYSTER, supra note 67, at 66-69.
309. Jed Rubenfeld offers an analogy to the danger inherent in mandatory service. Privacy rights exist,
he suggests, to prevent government from taking over and standardizing the lives of citizens by forcing them
into certain roles and directing their daily lives. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737,784 (1989). Universal service, with its avowedly educational function, poses a risk of this standardiza-
tion "of treating individuals as mere instrumentalities of the state, rather than as citizens with independent
minds who themselves constitute the state." Id. at 790. Republicanism offers, however, a more benign but
more paradoxical militia, in which citizens are both creatures and creators of the state, in which education
occurs not through state indoctrination but through dialogic interaction with diverse citizens. William F.
Buckey captures this balance well: "The state needs at once to be used, to 'work,' and to be kept at bay;
and the eternal question, of course, is, How to bind the citizen to the state without being bound by it?"
BUCKLEY, supra note 303, at 55.
310. The roster of those on record supporting the idea in the abstract includes Senators Sam Nunn,
Charles Robb, Edward Kennedy, and George Mitchell. See NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note 303, at xvii.
311. Among others, the redoubtable William F. Buckey, see BUCKLEY, supra note 303 ("taste-model
for the rich"), Mickey Kaus, First Serve, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1990, at 36 (reviewing BUCKLEY, supra
note 303), and Charles Peters, editor of Washington Monthly, see NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note 303, at
xvii.
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nent in any militia-surrogate.312 But it has one major limitation: it would not
give the people any direct control over general policy. Even if a service plan
were designed to promote maximal citizen control, participants could decide
only whom they served and how; they would not control the means of force
and could not check the government. If the population is not virtuous, that
result may be for the good, but it does not secure the functions of the old
militia.
3. Direct Participation
Thus, neither a safe militia nor universal service offers the chief benefit
of the old independent militia-direct control by the people of their govern-
ment. But neorepublicans have offered many other options to increase direct
participation by the people in their government.3 1 3 Frank Michelman has sug-
gested that a republican politics could occur
in the encounters and conflicts, interactions and debates that arise in
and around town meetings and local government agencies; civic and
voluntary organizations; social and recreational clubs; schools public
and private; managements, directorates and leadership groups of organi-
zations of all kinds; workplaces and shop floors; public events and
street life; and so on.314
Writing before the republican revival in the legal academy, Gerald Frug anal-
yzed the way that liberalism historically disempowered intermediate organiza-
tions as threatening individual autonomy; 315 in recognizably republican lan-
guage, he sought to reempower them in order to increase the control of citizens
over their lives.316 Professor Sunstein has offered a variety of options. Cam-
312. As Akhil Amar observes, public education might also offer the training in public virtue that the
militia, the jury, and the church were supposed to provide, see Amar, supra note 103, at 1208-10, and I
endorse that conclusion. From a republican perspective, however, public education has limits as well. Unlike
universal service, public education offers little class mixing as long as neighborhoods remain fairly
homogeneous; and like universal service, it offers little opportunity for direct control of government.
313. Some early neorepublican scholarship focused on opportunities for dialogue among government
officials. Frank Michelman argued that the Court could engage in the kind of republican dialogue that the
citizenry ideally should carry out. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 74. Cass Sunstein argued that the Court
could adopt measures that would prompt republican dialogue within the legislature. See Sunstein, supra note
10, at 1576-89. The Second Amendment, in contrast, would direct the attention of republicans not to the
Court or legislature, but to the people.
314. Michelman, supra note 66, at 1531.
315. Gerald E. Frog, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1087-89 (1980).
316. See id. at 1068-73, 1120-54. Indeed, in some ways Frog's description of the medieval city is
strikingly similar to the republican view of the militia. It was "neither the state nor the individual, neither
political nor economic, neither public nor private, yet [it had] autonomy protected against the power of the
central state." Id. at 1081. It"established the rights of a group that could not be distinguished from the rights
of the individuals within the group .... [A] strict identity [had been] established between [the] individual
interests and the town's interest as a whole." Id. at 1084. But the town was such a universal body only for
a certain class: it was created by and for merchants. See id. at 1083-85.
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paign finance reform might "improve political deliberation and.., promote
political equality and citizenship" by making it possible for people without
wealth to participate in the republican dialogue.317 Proportional representation
of groups, although it may presuppose entrenched interests, might serve republi-
can ends by ensuring that the dialogue includes voices that might not otherwise
be heard.318 These forms of popular empowerment paradoxically depend on state
support, but that fact makes the analogy to the militia even closer. The state
raised the militia to ensure universal access to the means of force, just as the
state would regulate campaign finance to promote universal access to the means
of communication. But the result of these activities was empowerment of the
body of the people against both the government and private factions with
disproportionate power,319 such as corporate speakers. 32°
Any of these options might promote some of the virtues of the militia by
giving the people a direct hand in their government. In toto, they may not
promote popular control as fully as did the militia because none gives posses-
sion of the means of force to the people. The echo of Levinson's warning
should therefore remain in our ears: one cannot trust a government that holds
all the arms. But it is important to remember that the republican militia was
a regulative ideal, not a practical reality. The militia was never truly universal.
The young nation always had a standing army; the people were never wholly
in control and perhaps never could be. Moreover, we need not adopt all of
More recently, Kathryn Abrams has called for "[riecovering the popular strain in republican theory,"
Abrams, supra note 293, at 1608, by reviving local government, see id. at 1604-06. Sunstein would also
reinvigorate intermediate organizations, with a new federalism or workplace democracy. See Sunstein, supra
note 10, at 1578.
317. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1577. Similarly, Jennifer Nedelsky has suggested that a properly
regulated public, rather than privately owned press, might increase the power of the people by assuring
greater access. See Nedelsky, supra note 66, at 14-15.
318. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1588-89. Professor Levinson notes the same republican ambiva-
lence about proportional representation but concludes that republicans would likely end up rejecting it. On
the one hand, proportional representation would ensure a fairer reflection of society as a whole, see Sanford
Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won't
It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L REV. 257, 262-63, 265, 270 (1985), but it would also produce "institutionalized
selfishness and partiality," rather than a commitment to the common good, id. at 275.
319. In response to Professor Frug, Professor Ellickson has argued for empowering homeowner
associations and not cities, on the grounds that membership in the former, but not the latter, is voluntary.
Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1519, 1521-23 (1982).
But Ellickson's objection, with its exclusive focus on individual volition, is solidly in the liberal tradition.
Indeed, Ellickson gladly, if ironically, describes himself as a "Prisoner of Liberal Thought." Id. at 1521.
For republicans, independence and rights are one horn of the dilemma in producing a healthy society, but
self-sacrifice and state organization are the other. In response to Ellickson, Professor Alexander has brought
this latter horn into focus. He argues that the state should intervene to prevent homeowners' associations
from becoming exclusive. As they become too exclusive, such associations come to resemble-in republican
terms-self-interested factions that wield disproportionate power, the state's invasion of these nodules of
privilege actually promotes community and empowerment. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group
Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-7, 55-61 (1989).
320. In fact, from a republican perspective, the government might actually guarantee access rights to
the means of communication as a means of popular empowerment, and not merely to restrain dominant
speakers. The analogy to the old republican proposals to give each citizen a gun seems very close as a
functional matter. See supra text accompanying note 233.
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historical republicanism. We should seek opportunities for the people to become
virtuous, but we can be discriminating in choosing among those opportunities.
Empowerment can take forms other than arms bearing, and it seems wise to
try those other forms first.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Amendment is not an embarrassing relic of an outdated scheme
of ideas. It guarantees a right to arms for reasons that are an integral part of
neorepublicanism. Use of arms in a militia was a form of communal coopera-
tion, characterized by self-sacrifice and independent judgment. The academic
left may be uncomfortable with gun ownership in modern America, but it
should not eschew the functions that the right serves.
The right to arms belonged to all, but as a collective right, a right of the
universal militia and not of separate private individuals. Republicans feared
government and sought to give the people ways to resist it, but they also feared
the self-interest that lurked in each individual's breast. They feared the militia
less than either private persons or the government because they identified the
militia with the body of the people-a rhetorical construct that by definition
could not betray the common good because the common good was its good.
That construct was utopian and artificial even at the time. Militia members had
separate and different interests, and the militia never truly represented the whole
body of the people. But as a regulative ideal, the concept of the militia offers
a guide to interpreting the Second Amendment.
The Amendment expresses a hope that the means of force could be vested
in those who would express universal good. But with the passage of two
centuries, it has become increasingly difficult to identify such a body. We have
no modern analogue of the universal militia. Private gun owners represent a
partial interest, and so does the National Guard. By the same token, it has
become increasingly difficult to identify a "common" interest among radically
heterogeneous citizens. The modern promises and problems of the Second
Amendment are thus the promises and problems of neorepublicanism generally.
To effectuate the Second Amendment, we must find a way to create a republi-
can politics in a liberal state. The right to arms is no anomaly within republi-
canism but a reflection of its deepest commitments. And the goal of the
Amendment will have been served if neorepublican reform succeeds.
The right to arms, however, should focus our attention on certain features
of republicanism. Neorepublicanism dwells largely on the hope that we can do
better than to pursue self-interest and to stand on our rights. But republicanism
balanced hope against fear, and the Second Amendment reflects this balance.
It takes seriously the idea that force lies at the root of politics. Neo-republican-
ism should never become so theoretical that it forgets to worry about the
distribution of power, or so organicist that it forgets to fear the government,
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or so optimistic that it forgets to fear private persons. Republicanism insists
that, in a democracy, one must at some point find a way to trust the people,
but this trust must not be naively given. Eventually, the people should reacquire
direct control of the means of force, but only when the right structures offer
them an opportunity for virtue.
At the same time, the militia ideal itself is wildly hopeful in the long run,
because it projects a time when the people hold the ultimate means of force.
To some, the right to arms may therefore suggest how little relevance neorepub-
licanism offers to today's world. Because we do not now have a universal
militia, the Amendment has little or no direct meaning for judges. At most, it
can influence the interpretation of other provisions. And as a regulative ideal,
the militia may seem even more specious: working toward a time when the
people should hold the means of coercion may seem like working toward the
impossible. Skepticism may be appropriate; it is important to be realistic about
the possibility of social change. But if skepticism becomes so deep that we can
no longer dream the dreams of democracy, it becomes only a prescription for
paralysis. Even contemplating the militia ideal may thus depend on some
measure of faith to triumph over terror, seeing the state of humankind and still
hoping for republican redemption, despite our inability to control our own
destinies.
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